Appendices

A Additional Results

Table A.1: Effects of pilot prime on compliance forecasts

	Dependent variable:	
	Compliance rate for call	Compliance rate for question
Pilot prime	0.021	−0.041
	(0.032)	(0.038)
Constant	0.502***	0.566***
	(0.021)	(0.028)
Num. obs.	144	144

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of compliance forecasts on the pilot prime indicator with HC2 standard errors. *Compliance rate for call* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects who answer the MPA's call. *Compliance rate for question* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects answering the call who also answer the MPA's question.

Table A.2: Effect heterogeneity compliance forecasts

	Dependent variable:	
	Compliance rate for call	Compliance rate for question
Pilot results x Neutral	0.042	0.021
	(0.064)	(0.076)
Pilot results x Optimistic	−0.037	−0.034
	(0.064)	(0.077)
Optimistic	0.005	−0.026
	(0.044)	(0.050)
Neutral	−0.019	−0.016
	(0.042)	(0.051)
Pilot results	−0.049	−0.087
	(0.047)	(0.056)
Constant	0.520***	0.568***
	(0.031)	(0.037)
Num. obs.	247	247

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS estimates with HC2 standard errors. *Compliance rate for call* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects who answer the MPA's call. *Compliance rate for question* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects answering the call who also answer the MPA's question. *Optimistic* refers to subjects who ranked themselves Very optimistic or Optimistic on a 1-5 scale that asked "How optimistic are you about the potential for information technology to improve governance in Pakistan?"

Table A.3: Effects on Forecasting Errors

	Phone		Question		Call MPA		
	Compl.	Compl.	Compl.	Compl.	ITT	ITT	ITT
Pilot prime	−0.003		−0.046		0.001		−0.006
	(0.028)		(0.034)		(0.005)		(0.007)
Compliance prime		−0.039*		0.052**		0.001	−0.005
		(0.022)		(0.025)		(0.005)	(0.008)
Interaction PxC							0.012
							(0.010)
Constant	0.240***	0.277***	0.348***	0.274***	0.045***	0.044***	0.047***
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Num. obs.	144	277	144	277	280	280	280

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of compliance and ITT forecast errors on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. Errors are defined as the absolute distance of initial forecasts vs actual compliance rates (73.1% for answering phone, 23.8% for answering question conditional on picking up the phone) or vs pilot information we told subjects about in the treatment (0.09 sd).

Table A.4: Effects on Correct Updating Direction

	MPA			Government			Accountability		
	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT
Pilot prime	−0.005		−0.011	0.006		0.014	−0.006		−0.001
	(0.006)		(0.008)	(0.006)		(0.009)	(0.007)		(0.009)
Compliance prime		0.012*	0.005		−0.004	0.003		−0.007	−0.002
		(0.006)	(0.008)		(0.006)	(0.010)		(0.007)	(0.009)
Interaction PxC			0.013			−0.014			−0.011
			(0.013)			(0.013)			(0.013)
Constant	0.033***	0.024***	0.030***	−0.057***	−0.052***	−0.059***	0.034***	0.034***	0.035***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Num. obs.	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of a continuous variable measuring the extent of updating in the correct direction on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. Updating in the correct direction measures the unit change in the update toward the right estimate for each outcome. Depending on where the subjects started (above or below the pilot estimate they were informed about), positive values indicate moving to the correct direction from *either* side.

Table A.5: Effects on Updating Magnitude

	MPA			Government			Accountability		
	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT
Pilot prime	−0.001		0.003	0.007		0.015	−0.000		0.012
	(0.007)		(0.008)	(0.007)		(0.009)	(0.007)		(0.010)
Compliance prime		−0.004	−0.000		−0.003	0.005		−0.015**	−0.001
		(0.007)	(0.009)		(0.007)	(0.010)		(0.007)	(0.011)
Interaction PxC			−0.008			−0.016			−0.027*
			(0.014)			(0.013)			(0.015)
Constant	−0.021***	−0.020***	−0.021***	−0.056***	−0.051***	−0.059***	0.016***	0.024***	0.017**
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Num. obs.	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of the extent of updating of ITT forecasts on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. Updating is defined as the difference between revised and initial ITT estimate, respectively for all outcomes.

Table A.6: Effects on Forecast ITT (Call-only treatment)

	MPA			Government			Accountability		
	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT
Pilot prime	0.002		0.003	0.005		−0.002	−0.006		−0.017
	(0.007)		(0.011)	(0.007)		(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.012)
Compliance prime		0.008	0.008		0.002	−0.006		0.017**	0.005
		(0.007)	(0.011)		(0.007)	(0.010)		(0.008)	(0.013)
Interaction PxC			−0.000			0.015			0.023
			(0.015)			(0.014)			(0.017)
Constant	0.088***	0.085***	0.083***	0.057***	0.059***	0.060***	0.051***	0.039***	0.048***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Num. obs.	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of all forecast outcomes on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. We focus here on the forecasts for the effects of the Call only (generic) treatments on the individual indices separately, i.e. forecast ITT for MPA evaluation, Government evaluation and Prospects for accountability.

Table A.7: Effects on Forecast ITT (Responsive treatment)

	MPA			Government			Accountability		
	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT
Pilot prime	0.001		0.008	0.010		0.008	0.001		−0.009
	(0.008)		(0.011)	(0.008)		(0.011)	(0.009)		(0.012)
Compliance prime		0.010	0.017		0.012	0.009		0.009	−0.001
		(0.008)	(0.011)		(0.008)	(0.010)		(0.009)	(0.012)
Interaction PxC			−0.013			0.006			0.022
			(0.016)			(0.015)			(0.017)
Constant	0.099***	0.094***	0.090***	0.070***	0.069***	0.064***	0.063***	0.059***	0.064***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Num. obs.	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of all forecast outcomes on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. We focus here on the forecasts for the effects of the Responsive treatment on the individual indices separately, i.e. forecast ITT for MPA evaluation, Government evaluation and Prospects for accountability.

Table A.8: Post-hoc power analysis

	Call ITT Forecasts	***Responsive ITT Forecasts***	***Compliance Forecasts***	
	Average	Average	Phone	Question
Minimum detectable effect	0.017	0.019	0.067	0.082
Actual effect of pilot prime	0.000	0.004		
Actual effect of compliance prime	0.009	0.010		
Actual effect of interaction	0.012	0.005		
Actual effect of pilot results			-0.048	-0.079

Notes: The main outcomes of interest are the average forecasts of the ITT of the call and the responsive treatment, respectively, as well as the forecast compliance rate both for answering the phone as well as answering a question conditional on answering the phone. The minimum detectable effect is calculated with the EGAP Power Calculator (https://egap.shinyapps.io/power-app/, accessed March 20, 2023) and takes as input sample size and standard deviation of the respective outcome variable. *Effect of pilot prime* denotes the effect of receiving information that a pilot study took place prior to full RCT. *Effect of compliance prime* denotes the effect of being asked to forecast the compliance rate of the RCT prior to forecasting the ITT effect. *Effect of pilot results* denotes the effect of being asked to forecast the compliance rate after receiving the information that pilot results were null. The effect sizes for the ITT forecasts are reported in Table 4 of the paper, and the effect sizes for the compliance rate forecasts in Table 5.

B Data collection procedures and coding principles analyzing published RCTs

We collected data for Figure 3 as follows:

1. Webscrape all abstracts from the webpages of the three journals (*APSR*, *AJPS*, and *JOP* until April 2021. We exclude short articles (research notes), symposia, book reviews and the like and include only research articles.

2. Identify articles that report results from an RCT via a text search using the following main search words: "field experiment" and "RCT."

3. Check procedure via text search with the following search words and hand-code whether an RCT or not: "experiment," "random," "trial," and "program eval."

4. Among articles reporting RCTs, hand-code whether main treatment effect on main outcome variable as hypothesized is null, i.e. does not have a significant effect at $p < 0.05$.

5. We do not consider heterogeneous treatment effects as main effects of an intervention, so the study is coded as reporting a null result if the main effect is null even if heterogeneous treatment effects are significant.

C Additional Sample Information

Table C.1: Summary statistics on main variables

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Familiarity	2.401	0.82	1	4
Optimism	3.056	0.86	1	5
Forecast Call Avg.	0.066	0.05	-0.21	0.22
Forecast Call Accountability	0.048	0.07	-0.25	0.25
Forecast Call Government	0.06	0.059	-0.15	0.25
Forecast Call MPA	0.089	0.061	-0.25	0.25
Forecast Responsive Avg.	0.079	0.056	-0.19	0.25
Forecast Responsive Accountability	0.064	0.072	-0.15	0.25
Forecast Responsive Government	0.075	0.063	-0.25	0.25
Forecast Responsive MPA	0.099	0.064	-0.17	0.25
Compliance rate phone	0.489	0.201	0.03	0.9
Compliance rate question	0.509	0.245	0.01	0.95

Table C.2: Experimental Subjects

Site	*N*
Centre for Economic Research in Pakistan (CERP)	27
APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics Mailing List	203
All Ph.D. students, UCLA and Stanford University	35
Grad seminar, University of California at San Diego	15
Total	280

D Balance Tests

Table D.1: Balance tests

	Familiarity			Optimism		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mean T1	2.309***	2.426***	2.468***	3.066***	3.050***	3.130***
	(0.105)	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.130)	(0.076)	(0.071)
T2	0.131			−0.006		
	(0.141)			(0.159)		
T3	0.052			−0.158		
	(0.150)			(0.165)		
T4	0.191			0.149		
	(0.134)			(0.170)		
Compliance prime		−0.049			0.013	
		(0.098)			(0.109)	
Pilot prime			−0.132			−0.146
			(0.098)			(0.109)
Num. obs.	279	279	279	249	249	249
F statistic	0.793	0.247	1.811	1.392	0.014	1.807

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of familiarity [1, 4] and optimism [1, 5] variables on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. For Compliance first (T1, T2), the reference group is (T3, T4) and for Pilot prime (T1, T3), the reference group is (T2, T4).

Table D.2: Balance Test I For Forecaster Position

	Dependent variable:		
	Faculty	Other research staff	Postdoc
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Compliance prime (T1+T2)	0.030	−0.027	−0.589
	(0.281)	(0.393)	(0.565)
Mean T3+T4	0.638***	−0.666**	−1.308***
	(0.203)	(0.282)	(0.356)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	643.523	643.523	643.523

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Multinomial logit coefficients from regressions of forecaster position with omitted baseline category Graduate students.

Table D.3: Balance Test II For Forecaster Position

	Dependent variable:		
	Faculty	Other research staff	Postdoc
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pilot prime (T1+T3)	0.055	−0.496	0.225
	(0.281)	(0.400)	(0.553)
Mean T2+T4	0.625***	−0.460*	−1.692***
	(0.201)	(0.261)	(0.411)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	642.278	642.278	642.278

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Multinomial logit coefficients from regressions of forecaster position with omitted baseline category Graduate students.

Table D.4: Balance Test III For Forecaster Position

	Dependent variable:		
	Faculty	Other research staff	Postdoc
	(1)	(2)	(3)
T1	0.407	0.606	0.200
	(0.391)	(0.556)	(0.876)
T2	0.440	0.124	0.951
	(0.396)	(0.610)	(0.777)
T3	−0.128	0.501	0.383
	(0.400)	(0.551)	(0.824)
Mean T1	0.464*	−1.012**	−1.992***
	(0.272)	(0.413)	(0.615)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	649.614	649.614	649.614

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Multinomial logit coefficients from regressions of forecaster position with omitted baseline category Graduate students.

E The Survey Instrument

US - FORECASTING THE EFFECTS OF IVR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN POLITICIANS AND CITIZENS - Copy

Survey Flow

Block: Informed Consent (1 Question)

BlockRandomizer: 1 - Evenly Present Elements

- EmbeddedData
  - Group = PILOT COMPLIANCE
- EmbeddedData
  - Group = PILOT
- EmbeddedData
  - Group = COMPLIANCE
- EmbeddedData
  - Group = NONE

Standard: Backgound (4 Questions)
Standard: Program Overview (3 Questions)
Standard: Compliance forecasts (1 Question)
Standard: Treatment effect forecasts (1 Question)
Standard: Comparison 1 (1 Question)
Standard: Comparison 2 (1 Question)

EmbeddedData
- blocking_back_buttons = yespls

Standard: Update Forecasts (8 Questions)

EmbeddedData
- blocking_back_buttons = yespls

Standard: Compliance forecasts - after survey (1 Question)

Page Break

Start of Block: Informed Consent

Q1 **Researchers: Miriam Golden, Saad Gulzar, and Luke Sonnet Informed Consent** In this survey, we ask you to forecast the effects of a program aimed at increasing communication between Members of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Assembly (MPA) and their constituents. We will describe the program, and ask you to use your expertise and judgement to tell us what you think happened. Your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to leave the survey at any time if you wish to. We will maintain your confidentiality by not recording any personally identifying information about you. We foresee little benefit or risk from participation, and cannot and do not guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits from this study. If you have questions about this research, please contact Luke Sonnet at +1 412 359 9106 or luke.sonnet@gmail.com.
We will be asking you to make predictions about the effects of an experiment. **If you are in the top one-quarter of respondents on this mailing list (by the absolute distance between your forecasts and the estimated effects), you will win a 10 dollar Amazon gift card. We will contact you once the surveys are complete with further instructions. Note this means the more accurate your predictions, the more likely you are to receive the payment.**
Are you willing to participate in this study?

- ○ Yes (1)
- ○ No (2)

Skip To: End of Survey If Researchers: Miriam Golden, Saad Gulzar, and Luke Sonnet Informed Consent In this survey, we as... = No

End of Block: Informed Consent

Start of Block: Backgound

Q2 Professional position

- ○ Undergraduate Student (10)
- ○ Graduate Student (1)
- ○ Post-Doctoral Fellow (9)
- ○ Faculty (2)
- ○ Other (8) _____

Q7 In what country are you based?

- ○ Pakistan (1)
- ○ United States (2)
- ○ Other (3) _____

Q8
How optimistic are you about the potential for information technology to improve governance in Pakistan?

- ○ Very pessimistic (1/5) (1)
- ○ Pessimistic (2/5) (2)
- ○ Not optimistic or pessimistic (3/5) (3)
- ○ Optimistic (4/5) (4)
- ○ Very optimistic (5/5) (5)
- ○ Don't know (6)
- ○ Refuse to answer (7)

Q9 How familiar are you with research on the use of information technology to improve governance?

- ○ Very unfamiliar (1/4) (1)
- ○ Unfamiliar (2/4) (2)
- ○ Familiar (3/4) (3)
- ○ Very familiar (4/4) (4)
- ○ Don't know (5)
- ○ Refuse to answer (6)

End of Block: Backgound

Start of Block: Program Overview

Q10 **Program Overview About the program:** In the months before the 2018 Provincial Assembly elections, we worked with 20 MPAs of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly. These MPAs recorded audio messages in their own voices that were sent to the constituents of the MPAs through automated robocalls. These robocalls went sent out to 720 representative male heads-of-households across 6 of the most electorally competitive villages in each MPA's constituency. This totals to 14,400 households eligible to receive a call in the program. These people had previously agreed to be contacted by the MPA when giving their phone numbers to us. Each MPA recorded messages with two main components. 1. Each MPA recorded a message **updating** people on his latest activities and accomplishments. 2. Each MPA crafted and recorded a **question** about policy priorities that people could respond to using the keypad on their mobile phone. This feedback is used in a later set of calls that we will describe later. **Timeline:** Each respondent received up to two calls from their MPA between March and June of 2018. We are going to ask you to forecast the effects of these calls on peoples'--opinions and behavior that we measured through door-to-door surveys between August and October of 2018, after the general elections.

Display This Question:

If Group = PILOT COMPLIANCE

Or Group = PILOT

Q11 Pilot and Scale-up: This program was designed through a pilot that we conducted with one MPA in Charsadda-II in 2016 (shown in red on the map). This pilot was conducted with 1,200 households. The scale-up project was implemented in the blue areas in this map:

Display This Question:

If Group = COMPLIANCE

Or Group = NONE

Q33 This project was carried out in the areas in blue on the following map:



End of Block: Program Overview

Start of Block: Compliance forecasts

Display This Question:

If Group = PILOT COMPLIANCE

Or Group = COMPLIANCE

Q12 First, we want to ask about compliance. What percentage of people completed our program?

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

What percentage of people we called answered the phone? All of these people agreed to receive a call from their MPA in a baseline survey. ()	
Among people who answered the phone, what percentage answered the question asked by the MPA? The call was recorded in the MPA's voice and the question came roughly 1 minute after the start of the call. ()	

End of Block: Compliance forecasts

Start of Block: Treatment effect forecasts

Q13 **Treatment effect forecasts**

You will now make forecasts in "standard deviation units" for ITT effects (i.e. ignoring take-up).

End of Block: Treatment effect forecasts

Start of Block: Comparison 1

Q16 COMPARISON 1 (ROBOCALL vs. CONTROL) Consider people who were called by their MPA with both the update about the MPA's activities and a question asking for feedback. Let's compare these people to those who received no call from the MPA.
Please note the units are standard deviation units.

Large negative effect	Medium negative effect	Small negative effect	No effect	Small positive effect	Medium positive effect	Large positive effect

-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25

How did calls affect peoples' evaluation of the MPA (MPA rating 1-10; MPA party rating 1-10; support for MPA party 0/1)? ()	
How did the calls affect peoples' evaluations of government performance (scales of whether state looks after them 1-5; importance of elections 1-5; provincial government competence 1-5)? ()	
How did the calls affect peoples' ability and willingness to hold MPAs accountable (political empowerment/efficacy scale 1-5; importance of MPA's performance in electoral choice 1-6)? ()	

End of Block: Comparison 1

Start of Block: Comparison 2

Q15 **COMPARISON 2 (RESPONSIVE vs GENERIC FOLLOW-UP)** After the first round of calls, some people received a follow-up call. Responsive calls thanked people for their input and specifically mentioned what action the MPA intended to take after receiving aggregated information from the first round of calls. Generic calls only thanked them for their input.

Please note the units are standard deviation units.

Large negative effect | Medium negative effect | Small negative effect | No effect | Small positive effect | Medium positive effect | Large positive effect

-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25

How did receiving the responsive as compared to the generic follow-up affect peoples' evaluation of the MPA (MPA rating 1-10; MPA party rating 1-10; support for MPA party 0/1)? ()	
How did receiving the responsive as compared to the generic follow-up affect peoples' evaluations of government performance (scales of whether state looks after them 1-5; importance of elections 1-5; provincial government competence 1-5)? ()	
How did receiving the responsive as compared to the generic follow-up affect peoples' ability and willingness to hold MPAs accountable (political empowerment/efficacy scale 1-5; importance of MPA's performance in electoral choice 1-6)? ()	

End of Block: Comparison 2

Start of Block: Update Forecasts

Display This Question:

If Group = COMPLIANCE

Or Group = NONE

Q23 **Pilot and Scale-up:** This program was designed through a pilot that we conducted with one MPA in Charsadda-II in 2016 (shown in red on the map). This pilot was conducted with 1,200 households. The scale-up project was implemented in the blue areas in this map:

Display This Question:

If Group = COMPLIANCE

Or Group = NONE

Q24

Q17 UPDATE FORECASTS

Now we want to give you an opportunity to update your forecasts. We will present you with the estimated treatment effect from our pilot with 1,200 HH in one constituency, your forecast from the previous section, and allow you to make a new forecast if you would like.

COMPARISON 1 (ROBOCALL vs. CONTROL) Consider people who were called by their MPA with both the update about the MPA's activities and a question asking for feedback. Let's compare these people to those who received no call from the MPA.

Please note the units are standard deviation units.

PILOT ESTIMATE: +0.09 standard deviation units
YOUR FORECAST: ${Q16/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1} standard deviation units

Large negative effect | Medium negative effect | Small negative effect | No effect | Small positive effect | Medium positive effect | Large positive effect

-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25

How did calls affect peoples' evaluation of the MPA (MPA rating 1-10; MPA party rating 1-10; support for MPA party 0/1)? ()	

Q27 **PILOT ESTIMATE: -0.05 standard deviation units**YOUR FORECAST: ${Q16/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2} standard deviation units

Large negative effect | Medium negative effect | Small negative effect | No effect | Small positive effect | Medium positive effect | Large positive effect

-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25

How did the calls affect peoples' evaluations of government performance (scales of whether state looks after them 1-5; importance of elections 1-5; provincial government competence 1-5)? ()	

Q28 **PILOT ESTIMATE: +0.12 standard deviation units**YOUR FORECAST: ${Q16/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3} standard deviation units

Large negative effect | Medium negative effect | Small negative effect | No effect | Small positive effect | Medium positive effect | Large positive effect

-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25

How did the calls affect peoples' ability and willingness to hold MPAs accountable (political empowerment/efficacy scale 1-5; importance of MPA's performance in electoral choice 1-6)? ()	

Q29 COMPARISON 2 (RESPONSIVE vs GENERIC FOLLOW-UP) After the first round of calls, some people received a follow-up call. Responsive calls thanked people for their input and specifically mentioned what action the MPA intended to take after receiving aggregated information from the first round of calls. Generic calls only thanked them for their input. Please note the units are standard deviation units.

PILOT ESTIMATE: +0.01 standard deviation units

YOUR FORECAST: **${Q15/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/1}** standard deviation units

Large negative effect | Medium negative effect | Small negative effect | No effect | Small positive effect | Medium positive effect | Large positive effect

-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25

How did receiving the responsive as compared to the generic follow-up affect peoples' evaluation of the MPA (MPA rating 1-10; MPA party rating 1-10; support for MPA party 0/1)? ()	

Q31 **PILOT ESTIMATE: +0.03 standard deviation units**

YOUR FORECAST: ${Q15/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/2} standard deviation units

Large negative effect | Medium negative effect | Small negative effect | No effect | Small positive effect | Medium positive effect | Large positive effect

-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25

How did receiving the responsive as compared to the generic follow-up affect peoples' evaluations of government performance (scales of whether state looks after them 1-5; importance of elections 1-5; provincial government competence 1-5)? ()	

Q32 **PILOT ESTIMATE: +0.05 standard deviation units**
YOUR FORECAST: ${Q15/ChoiceNumericEntryValue/3} standard deviation units

Large negative effect	Medium negative effect	Small negative effect	No effect	Small positive effect	Medium positive effect	Large positive effect

-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25

How did receiving the responsive as compared to the generic follow-up affect peoples' ability and willingness to hold MPAs accountable (political empowerment/efficacy scale 1-5; importance of MPA's performance in electoral choice 1-6)? ()	

End of Block: Update Forecasts

Start of Block: Compliance forecasts - after survey

Display This Question:
If Group = NONE
Or Group = PILOT

Q22 Now we'd like to ask about compliance. What percentage of people completed our program?

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

What percentage of people we called answered the phone? All of these people agreed to receive a call from their MPA in a baseline survey. ()	
Among people who answered the phone, what percentage answered the question asked by the MPA? The call was recorded in the MPA's voice and the question came roughly 1 minute after the start of the call. ()	

End of Block: Compliance forecasts - after survey