**Supplementary Appendix to Incentives in Elite Surveys:**

**Experimental Evidence from a Survey of World Bank staff**

Table of Contents

[1. Additional analyses 2](#_Toc149133530)

[2. Pre-registration 10](#_Toc149133531)

[3. Ethics Appendix 12](#_Toc149133532)

# 1. Additional analyses

Table A1: regressing link clicks on incentives

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Information | -0.0099 | -0.0130 | -0.0090 |
|  | (0.0156) | (0.0194) | (0.0188) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Amazon | -0.0334+ | -0.0380 | -0.0334+ |
|  | (0.0188) | (0.0244) | (0.0188) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Charity | 0.0069 | 0.0070 | 0.0082 |
|  | (0.0194) | (0.0194) | (0.0256) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Information \* Amazon |  | 0.0096 |  |
|  | (0.0323) |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Information \* Charity |  |  | -0.0027 |
|  |  | (0.0334) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.1832\*\*\* | 0.1846\*\*\* | 0.1828\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0155) | (0.0164) | (0.0163) |
| *N* | 2328 | 2328 | 2328 |
| *R*2 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 |

Clustered standard errors in parentheses; + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A2: regressing educational backgrounds on incentives

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|  | Economic Sciences | Engineering | Health Sciences | Social Science |
| Information | -0.0023 | 0.0606 | -0.0204 | 0.0297 |
|  | (0.0722) | (0.0559) | (0.0382) | (0.0549) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Amazon | 0.1229 | 0.0217 | -0.0355 | -0.0282 |
|  | (0.0916) | (0.0715) | (0.0597) | (0.0711) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Charity | 0.0856 | 0.0079 | -0.0674 | -0.0484 |
|  | (0.0834) | (0.0622) | (0.0409) | (0.0621) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.5925\*\*\* | 0.1161\*\* | 0.0928+ | 0.1569\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0667) | (0.0432) | (0.0479) | (0.0462) |
| *N* | 178 | 178 | 178 | 178 |
| *R*2 | 0.011 | 0.008 | 0.014 | 0.005 |

Clustered standard errors in parentheses; + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A3: regressing gender (women coded as 1, other genders as 0) on incentives

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | (11) |
|  |  |
| Information | -0.1234+ |
|  | (0.0691) |
|  |  |
| Amazon | -0.0338 |
|  | (0.0883) |
|  |  |
| Charity | 0.0460 |
|  | (0.0805) |
|  |  |
| Constant | 0.3544\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0660) |
| *N* | 173 |
| *R*2 | 0.022 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses; + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A4: regressing regional focus Africa (work and nationality) on incentives

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (12) | (13) |
|  | Work on African countries | Are from African countries |
| Information | 0.0246 | -0.0215 |
|  | (0.0738) | (0.0585) |
|  |  |  |
| Amazon | -0.0627 | 0.0370 |
|  | (0.0947) | (0.0788) |
|  |  |  |
| Charity | -0.0272 | -0.0173 |
|  | (0.0844) | (0.0654) |
|  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.3843\*\*\* | 0.1732\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0652) | (0.0512) |
| *N* | 178 | 169 |
| *R*2 | 0.003 | 0.004 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses; + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A5: regressing duration of response (count of seconds) on incentives

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| Information | 1.7398\*\*\* | 1.9214\*\*\* | 2.2497\*\*\* |
|  | (0.4422) | (0.4929) | (0.5067) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Amazon | 0.0413 | 0.3742 | 0.2002 |
|  | (0.5618) | (0.6565) | (0.5260) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Charity | -0.9584+ | -0.8908+ | -0.3159 |
|  | (0.4926) | (0.4661) | (0.4724) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Information \* Amazon |  | -0.7047 |  |
|  | (1.0597) |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Information \* Charity |  |  | -1.3657 |
|  |  | (0.9546) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 7.9803\*\*\* | 7.8630\*\*\* | 7.6707\*\*\* |
|  | (0.3701) | (0.3396) | (0.3008) |
| / |  |  |  |
| lnalpha | 0.8480\*\*\* | 0.8420\*\*\* | 0.8186\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0901) | (0.0882) | (0.0989) |
| *N* | 178 | 178 | 178 |
| pseudo *R*2 | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.023 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses; + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Table A6: coded journal articles

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Journal** | **Citation** | **year** | **Incentives reported** | **Response rate survey 1** | **Response rate survey 2** | **Response rate survey 3** |
| International Organization | Hooghe, L. (2005): Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission. *International Organization,* *59*(4), 861-898. | 2005 | Yes | 41 | 51 |  |
| Journal of European Public Policy | Bauer, M (2008): Diffuse anxieties, deprived entrepreneurs: Commission reform and middle management, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(5), 691-707. | 2008 | No | 58 |  |  |
| Governance | Trondal, J., Van den Berg, C, Suvarierol, S. (2008): The Compound Machinery of Government: The Case of Seconded Officials in the European Commission. *Governance*, *21*(2), 253–274. | 2008 | No | 58 | 46 | 86 |
| Journal of European Public Policy | Ellinas, A., Suleiman, E. (2008): Reforming the Commission: between modernization and bureaucratization, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(5), 708-725. | 2008 | No | NA |  |  |
| Journal of Common Market Studies | Cunha, A, Swinbank, A. (2009): Exploring the Determinants of CAP Reform: A Delphi Survey of Key Decision-Makers. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *47*(2), 235–261. | 2009 | No | 53 |  |  |
| Journal of European Public Policy | Egeberg, M., Trondal, J. (2011): EU-level agencies: new executive centre formation or vehicles for national control?, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(6), 868-887. | 2011 | No | NA |  |  |
| Journal of European Public Policy | Wonka, A., Rittberger, B. (2011): Perspectives on EU governance: an empirical assessment of the political attitudes of EU agency professionals, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(6), 888-908. | 2011 | No | 26 |  |  |
| Journal of European Public Policy | Murdoch, Z., Geys, B. (2012) Instrumental calculation, cognitive role-playing, or both? Self-perceptions of seconded national experts in the European Commission, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19:9, 1357-1376. | 2012 | No | 60 |  |  |
| Journal of European Public Policy | Henökl, T. & Trondal, J. (2015) Unveiling the anatomy of autonomy: dissecting actor-level independence in the European External Action Service, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(10), 1426-1447. | 2015 | No | 30 |  |  |
| Journal of European Public Policy | Hustedt, T, Seyfried, M. (2016): Co-ordination across internal organizational boundaries: how the EU Commission co-ordinates climate policies, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(6), 888-905. | 2016 | No | 23.6 |  |  |
| International Organization | Lall, R. (2017): Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Organizations. *International Organization* 71(2): 245-280 | 2017 | No | NA |  |  |
| Journal of Common Market Studies | Hustedt, T., & Seyfried, M. (2018). Inside the EU Commission: Evidence on the Perceived Relevance of the Secretariat General in Climate Policy‐Making. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *56*(2), 368–384. | 2018 | No | NA |  |  |
| Journal of European Public Policy | Murdoch, Z, Connolly S., Kassim, H. (2018): Administrative legitimacy and the democratic deficit of the European Union, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25:3, 389-408. | 2018 | No | 35 | 35 |  |
| Review of International Organizations | Hardt, H. (2018): Who matters for memory: Sources of institutional memory in international organization crisis management. *Reviev of International Organizations* **13**, 457–482. | 2018 | No | NA |  |  |
| European Journal of International Relations | Murdoch, Z., Hussein, K., Connolly, S., & Benny, G. (2019). Do international institutions matter? socialization and international bureaucrats.*European Journal of International Relations, 25*(3), 852-877. | 2019 | No | 13.6 | 20.8 |  |
| Journal of Common Market Studies | Gastinger, M., Adriaensen, J. (2019). Of Principal(s’) Interest? A Disaggregated, Multiple Principals’ Approach to Commission Discretion. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *57*(2), 353–370. | 2019 | No | NA |  |  |
| International Organization | Clark, R. 2021. “Pool or Duel? Cooperation and Competition Among International Organizations,’ *International Organization 74*(4): 1133-1153 | 2021 | Yes | <1 |  |  |
| Review of International Political Economy | Miró, J. (2021): Austerity’s failures and policy learning: mapping European Commission officials’ beliefs on fiscal governance in the post-crisis EU, *Review of International Political Economy*, 28(5), 1224-1248. | 2021 | No | 18.8 |  |  |
| International Studies Quarterly | Briggs, R. (2021): Why Does Aid Not Target the Poorest?, *International Studies Quarterly*, 65(3) September 2021, Pages 739–752. | 2021 | No | 4.6 |  |  |
| Global Policy | Trondal, J., Tieku, T., Ganzle, S. (2022): The Organizational Dimension of Executive Authority in the Global South: Insights from the AU and ECOWAS Commissions. *Global Policy* 14(1): 31-47. | 2022 | No | 10 |  |  |
| Governance | Murdoch, Z., Connolly, S., Kassim, H., & Geys, B. (2022). Legitimacy crises and the temporal dynamics of bureaucratic representation. *Governance*, *35*(1), 65–82. | 2022 | No | NA |  |  |
| Journal of European Public Policy | Duina, F. (2022) Is academic research useful to EU officials? The logic of institutional openness in the Commission, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 29:9, 1493-1511. | 2022 | No | NA |  |  |
| Journal of Common Market Studies | Leidorf, T., de Boer, T. (2023). Account‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape: A Comprehensive Review of EU agencies’ Institutional Accountability Relationships. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *61*(1), 215–235. | 2023 | No | 34.1 |  |  |

Figure A1: Share of respondents by educational background



Figure A2: Share of respondents by main World Bank sector of their work



Figure A3: Share of respondents by main World Bank region of their work



Figure A4: Share of respondents by nationality (geographical regions)



Figure A5: Share of respondents by self-reported gender



# 2. Pre-registration

The following text details the anonymized preregistration we uploaded under LINK on the 31st of March 2022. The document was uploaded during the time the field experiment was under way and updates a previous preregistration document uploaded on the 3rd of March 2022 under https://osf.io/mv4be. The only change between the two documents is the inclusion of “, vce(robust)” in the code detailed in Footnote 1, 2, and 3. We made this change before attaining the results because linear probability models are always heteroskedastic.

“**Preregistration of incentive experiment with World Bank Task Team Leaders**

This document pre-registers hypotheses and the research design for an incentive experiment that is part of a broader survey experiment focusing on the preferences of World Bank Task Team Leaders (TTLs). The purpose of this part of the study is to understand how different incentives given to policy elites impact their motivation to partake in elite surveys. The main ambition of this embedded experiment is methodological.

We use three types of incentives. First, in line with the broader literature on survey research we provide a monetary incentive through entering a lottery to win 100 USD amazon gift cards. The amount is chosen because World Bank staff is allowed to accept gifts of up to 100 USD in a 12-month period. Second, we provide a charity incentive that promises a 10 USD donation on behalf of each respondent to GiveDirectly (up to 3000 USD). Third, we provide informational incentives. Dietrich et al. (2021) suggest using informational incentives promising a short report on the results of the survey to respondents. Respondents are randomly allocated into one of six groups.

Because we create emails from a template and use data from a long time period, we anticipate that not all emails actually reach their intended receiver. If we assume that around 10% of emails bounce back, we end up with approximately 4,500 potential respondents. With a response rate of 5.5%, we would receive questionnaires from around 250 respondents. Table 1 displays the six groups, the incentives given and the number of World Bank staff contacted.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Amazon gift card incentive | Charity incentive | Informational incentive | No of contacts |
| Group 1 (control) | No | No | No | 825 |
| Group 2 | Yes | No | No | 825 |
| Group 3 | No | Yes | No | 825 |
| Group 4 | No | No | Yes | 825 |
| Group 5 | Yes | No | Yes | 825 |
| Group 6 | No | Yes | Yes | 825 |

We estimate simple linear probability model with robust standard errors. The unit of analysis is the contacted staff member. The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether an individual completed the survey. We will create binary variables coded as 1 if a treatment was included in the contact email and as 0 if not. The following hypotheses will be tested:

Main effects: [[1]](#footnote-1)

*H1: Inclusion in the lottery for Amazon gift cards increases the likelihood of completing the survey*

*H2: A donation for GiveDirectly increases the likelihood of completing the survey*

*H3: The promise to receive a report on the findings increases the likelihood of completing the survey*

Interaction effects:[[2]](#footnote-2),[[3]](#footnote-3)

*H4: Inclusion in the lottery for Amazon gift cards combined with the promise to receive a report on the findings increases the likelihood of completing the survey*

*H5: A donation for GiveDirectly combined with the promise to receive a report on the findings increases the likelihood of completing the survey*

Additionally, we will perform exploratory analyses to grasp whether incentives affect which groups of TTLs respond to the survey more. Specifically, we are interested in differences by respondents’ demographic background (gender, nationality and education) and their area of work (World Bank sectors). The main purpose of this part of the analysis is to test whether certain incentives are more likely to lead to biased samples. We will also explore whether respondents’ engagement with the survey (time taken to answer) is different depending on the type of incentive. We do not have strong expectations on potential sub-group differences or respondent engagement and, therefore, do not preregister hypotheses. This limitation will be acknowledged in the paper.”

# 3. Ethics Appendix

The study attained an exemption from the University of Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board under study number: STUDY00001310. The study adheres to APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research. We provide some more information on specific issues below:

**Deception or potential harms:** Participants did not know which experimental group they were part of. The study had minimal risk and we are not aware of any potential harm posed to participants.

**Process for consent and debriefing participants:** Participants that clicked on the survey link were debriefed as part of a comprehensive consent statement. We did not attain consent from participants that did not click on the survey link. However, we also did not collect any other data from them except for whether they clicked on the survey link.

**Compensation:** Discussed in detail in the manuscript.

1. Stata code: reg outcome info amazon donation, vce(robust) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Stata code: reg outcome info##amazon donation, vce(robust) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Stata code: reg outcome info##donation amazon, vce(robust) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)