A Appendix

Figure 3: Edmundson Mayor's Memo to Police Department Re Traffic Tickets

Date: April 18, 2014 To: Edmundson P. D. — Sergeants and Patrolmen Subject: Traffic tickets In the past several weeks, the Board and I have noticed a marked downturn in traffic and other tickets being weitien by your department. It is correct that we have no queens and want only "good fickets" written. However, we do have a riccord of your past performance to compare to your outnett performance and the picture that I see its a very disappointing one. I wish to take this opportunity to remind you that the tickets that you write do add to the revenue on which the P. D. budget is established and will directly affect pay adjustments at budget time. It is and has always been the desire of myself and the Board to provide a safe and pleasant work place with good compensation and benefits for everyone. However, our ability to continue doing this is being compromised by your work slow down. I realize that your work production records are directly affected by many extensiting circumstances and those factors are always accounted for as your work records are reviewed by myself and human resources. As budget time approaches, please make a self evaluation of your work labits and motivations, then make the changes that you see that will be fair to yourself and the city. Thank you

Table 10: Demographics of Agencies with and without Finance Data

	Mean Tot	al Population	Mean	Pct. White
Year	Finance Data	No Finance Data	Finance Data	No Finance Data
2000	42320.09	2986.71	90.09	91.06
2012	72116.08	5011.89	81.51	93.13

Table 10 shows that our sample where data are matched tend to have the highest population (this is where IndFin does an annual, rather than five-year survey). The places with merged finance data have somewhat larger minority population shares.


In results available upon request, we also ran 2SLS regressions instrumenting fiscal distress with lagged inter-government revenues. There was still a positive effect of fiscal distress on white driver citation rates, but the interactions for black and Latino were insignificant. The main results are robust to weighting by 2000 population.

Table 11 presents the results from an additional heterogeneity analysis. One might wonder whether the effects of fiscal distress are concentrated in rural or urban areas, or whether they are

Figure 4: Vehicle Stop Information Form, Missouri Racial Profiling Database

VEHICLE STOP INFORMATION	VEHICLE STOP INFORMATION
DATE TIME AM	DATE TIME AM MM DD YY
1 VIOLATION RESULTING IN STOP (✓ all that apply)	1 VIOLATION RESULTING IN STOP (all that apply)
□MOVING □ EQUIPMENT □LICENSE □INVESTIGATIVE	MOVING EQUIPMENT LICENSE INVESTIGATIVE
If a "moving" violation, (category of violation)	If a "moving" violation, (\checkmark category of violation)
SPEED SLANE VIOLATION FOLLOW TOO CLOSE	SPEED SANE VIOLATION SPOLLOW TOO CLOSE
CVE FAIL TO SIGNAL OTHER MOVING VIOLATION	□CVE □ FAIL TO SIGNAL □ OTHER MOVING VIOLATION
2 RESULT OF STOP (all that apply)	2 RESULT OF STOP (✔ all that apply)
□ CITATION □ WARNING □ NO ACTION □ OTHER	☐ CITATION ☐ WARNING ☐ NO ACTION ☐ OTHER
3 DRIVER'S RACE/MINORITY STATUS (based only on visual observation)	3 DRIVER'S RACE/MINORITY STATUS (based only on visual observation)
□WHITE □BLACK/AFRICAN-AMERICAN □HISPANIC/LATINO	□WHITE □BLACK/AFRICAN-AMERICAN □HISPANIC/LATINO
□ AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE □ ASIAN □ OTHER/UNKNOWN	□ AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE □ ASIAN □ OTHER/UNKNOWN
4 DRIVER'S AGE □UNDER 18 □18-29 □ 30-39 □ 40+	4 DRIVER'S AGE □UNDER 18 □18-29 □ 30-39 □ 40+
5 DRIVER'S GENDER MALE FEMALE	5 DRIVER'S GENDER MALE FEMALE
6 LOCATION OF STOP	6 LOCATION OF STOP
☐ INTERSTATE HIGHWAY ☐ U.S. HIGHWAY ☐ STATE HIGHWAY	☐ INTERSTATE HIGHWAY ☐ U.S. HIGHWAY ☐ STATE HIGHWAY
□ COUNTY ROAD □ CITY STREET □ OTHER	□ COUNTY ROAD □ CITY STREET □ OTHER
7 WAS A SEARCH INITIATED? □YES □NO	7 WAS A SEARCH INITIATED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
If YES, probable cause/authority for search (✓ all that apply)	If YES, probable cause/authority for search (all that apply)
□ CONSENT □ INVENTORY □ DRUG/ALCOHOL ODOR	□ CONSENT □ INVENTORY □ DRUG/ALCOHOL ODOR
☐ INCIDENT TO ARREST ☐ PLAIN VIEW CONTRABAND ☐ OTHER	☐ INCIDENT TO ARREST ☐ PLAIN VIEW CONTRABAND ☐ OTHER
□DRUG DOG ALERT □REASONABLE SUSPICION-WEAPON (TERRY STOP)	□DRUG DOG ALERT □REASONABLE SUSPICION-WEAPON (TERRY STOP)
8 WHAT WAS SEARCHED?	8 WHAT WAS SEARCHED?
□ DRIVER ONLY □ PROPERTY ONLY □ DRIVER AND PROPERTY	□ DRIVER ONLY □ PROPERTY ONLY □ DRIVER AND PROPERTY
9 DURATION OF SEARCH	9 DURATION OF SEARCH
☐ 0-15 MINUTES ☐ 16-30 MIN. ☐ 31+ MIN.	□ 0-15 MINUTES □16-30 MIN. □ 31+ MIN.
10 WAS CONTRABAND DISCOVERED? YES NO	10 WAS CONTRABAND DISCOVERED? YES NO
If YES, type of contraband (✔ all that apply)	If YES, type of contraband (all that apply)
□ DRUGS/ALCOHOL/PARAPHERNALIA □ CURRENCY □ WEAPON □ STOLEN PROPERTY □ OTHER	□ DRUGS/ALCOHOL/PARAPHERNALIA □ CURRENCY □ WEAPON □ STOLEN PROPERTY □ OTHER
11 WAS DRIVER ARRESTED? □YES □NO	11 WAS DRIVER ARRESTED? □YES □NO
12 IF ARREST MADE, CRIME/VIOLATION ALLEGED (all that apply)	12 IF ARREST MADE, CRIME/VIOLATION ALLEGED (all that apply)
□ OUTSTANDING WARRANT □ OFFENSE AGAINST PERSON	☐ OUTSTANDING WARRANT ☐ OFFENSE AGAINST PERSON
☐ RESISTING ARREST ☐ DRUG VIOLATION ☐ DWI/BAC	RESISTING ARREST DRUG VIOLATION DWI/BAC
□ PROPERTY CRIME □ TRAFFIC VIOLATION □ OTHER	□ PROPERTY CRIME □ TRAFFIC VIOLATION □ OTHER
Revised September 2004	Revised September 2004

Figure 5: Distribution of Lagged Revenue Changes



Histogram of lagged log revenue changes from merged IndFin data. Bin width = .01. Vertical dashed line at zero.

concentrated in areas with relatively large populations of people of color. To make the categories referenced in the table, we divided the sample at the median values of urban density and racial makeup. First, we see that for both citations, and arrests, the effects are concentrated in rural areas. This makes sense, if these areas have more white residents than urban areas. Indeed, the increase in citations of white drivers in times of fiscal distress occurs in areas with smaller black populations. The increases in arrests of white drivers, however, is found in areas with larger black populations. This could be because communities of color are more heavily and harshly policed than other communities, such that white residents found in those communities during times of fiscal distressed are the ones police target, for example.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(8)
	Δ Citation	on Rate	A Arre	Δ Arrest Rate	Δ Citati	Δ Citation Rate	Δ <u>Arre</u>	Δ Arrest Rate
Fiscal Distress	0.0738*	0.0200	0.0332+	0.00426	0.0669*	0.0285	0.0268+	0.0277*
\times White Driver	(0.0295)	(0.0210)	(0.0182)	(0.00685)	(0.0298)	(0.0230)	(0.0156)	(0.0138)
Fiscal Distress	-0.0431	0.0199	-0.0689	0.0206	-0.0321	0.0176	-0.0473	0.0116
\times Black Driver	(0.0568)	(0.0274)	(0.0464)	(0.0131)	(0.0571)	(0.0317)	(0.0498)	(0.0203)
Fiscal Distress	-0.0580	0.0590	0.0214	0.0183	0.000496	-0.0351	0.0320	0.0170
×Latino Driver	(0.0684)	(0.0415)	(0.0442)	(0.0211)	(0.0649)	(0.0545)	(0.0371)	(0.0395)
Sample	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	<2.8% Black	>2.8% Black	<2.8% Black	>2.8% Black
Agency-Race FE's	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
Race-Year FE's	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
Demographics	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
Stop Reasons	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
Arrest Reasons			×	×			×	×
N	1742	1619	1280	1332	1696	1665	1291	1321
R^2	0.199	0.284	0.560	0.477	0.230	0.232	0.547	0.162

Notes. Observation is an agency-race-year, where whites, blacks, and Latinos are included. Fiscal Distress is defined as the log negative revenue change. $\times Black$ Driver and $\times Latino$ Driver indicate the interaction between Fiscal Distress and dummy variables for the respective driver race. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by agency. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.