Appendix to "Representation, Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: The Counterbalancing Effect of Black Political Incorporation"

Contents

       This appendix details a variety of additional robustness checks and data. It is organized as follows: first, a correlation matrix; second, a series of bivariate regressions; third, alternative dependent variables; fourth, alternative independent variables; fifth, an interaction between the partisan politics and social incorporation theories; sixth, the addition of quadratic terms; seventh, a comparison of Southern and non-Southern states; eighth, the addition of additional control variables; ninth, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in place of the two-way fixed effects estimation; tenth, subsetting the data to different time periods; and eleventh, showing the positive relationship between corrections spending and incarceration rates in the following year.

1 Correlation Matrix

Table 1 reflects the correlation matrix for the main variables of interest in the paper: the logged spending on total, institutional, and community corrections spending, percent Black state population, percent Black state legislators, Republican governor, the proportion of Republicans in the state legislature, violent crime rate, and incarceration rate.

From the table, it is evident the spending variables are highly correlated with each other, an unsurprising result considering institutional and community corrections spending sum to form total corrections spending. Similarly, percent Black state population and percent Black state legislators are highly correlated, at 0.86. Other than those variables, the correlations remain moderate - incarceration rate, for example, is moderately correlated with both percent Black and percent Black legislators (0.60 and 0.56, respectively), but has a lower correlation with the spending variables. This provides encouraging evidence that changes in corrections spending are not due to a high correlation between those variables and other important determinants of this spending, like incarceration rate and violent crime rate.

	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC	Percent Black Legislators	Percent Black Voters	Republican Governor	Proportion Rep. Legislators	Violent Crime Rate	Incarceration Rate	Revenue Capita	Proportion Minority
Total Corrections PC	1.00	0.96	0.62	0.05	-0.16	-0.04	0.11	0.28	0.45	0.71	0.31
Institutions PC	0.96	1.00	0.37	0.04	-0.16	-0.02	0.13	0.26	0.44	0.72	0.30
Community PC	0.62	0.37	1.00	0.04	-0.05	-0.07	0.00	0.20	0.24	0.33	0.17
Percent Black Legislators	0.05	0.04	0.04	1.00	0.11	0.05	-0.23	0.48	0.56	-0.06	0.65
Percent Blacks Who Voted	-0.16	-0.16	-0.05	0.11	1.00	-0.03	-0.05	0.07	-0.05	-0.25	-0.00
Republican Governor	-0.04	-0.02	-0.07	0.05	-0.03	1.00	0.16	-0.04	0.10	0.03	0.07
Proportion Rep. Legislators	0.11	0.13	0.00	-0.23	-0.05	0.16	1.00	-0.20	0.08	0.17	-0.15
Violent Crime Rate	0.28	0.26	0.20	0.48	0.07	-0.04	-0.20	1.00	0.38	-0.05	0.60
Incarceration Rate	0.45	0.44	0.24	0.56	-0.05	0.10	0.08	0.38	1.00	0.34	0.69
Revenue Per Capita	0.71	0.72	0.33	-0.06	-0.25	0.03	0.17	-0.05	0.34	1.00	0.12
Proportion Minority	0.31	0.30	0.17	0.65	-0.00	0.07	-0.15	0.60	0.69	0.12	1.00

Table 1: Correlation Matrix

2   Bivariate Regressions

The results displayed in the main tables show exceedingly high R^2's, over 0.8. To combat these concerns, and show that the results are not dependent on the specific modeling choice here, Table 2 show the results of four regressions using total and institutional corrections spending per capita (community corrections spending not shown here, as the specifications were largely insignificant). The first column of each dependent variable shows only the bivariate relationship between either percent Black or percent Black legislators and either total or institutional corrections spending per capita. The next column adds state and year fixed effects; the third, ideological control variables including Republican governor and proportion Republican legislators; and the fourth, adds a host of control variables that could be related to corrections spending. In addition to violent crime rate, incarceration rate, revenue per capita, and proportion minority, which are included in the main specification, the covariates included below are: electoral competition, a dummy for gubernatorial election year, legislative professionalism, gubernatorial control of the budget process, the Berry et al. (2010) measure of citizen ideology, the Gini index, unemployment, and a state's population of Evangelical residents. More details on the source of these variables below.

Broad institutional constraints like electoral pressures could drive both governors and state legislators to raise corrections expenditures, as crime is popular with voters (Enns 2016, Simon 2007, Smith 2004, Stucky, Heimer and Lang 2007). Moreover, states that are more professional may allocate more money to specific agencies or policies that benefit their constituencies (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003), and/or governors that have more control over the budget process similarly allocate funds to wider constituencies to woo more voters (Bernick 2016). The second broad set of additional variables not explicitly considered in the main specification consider societal constraints, like inequality, on corrections spending. A higher number of marginalized groups, whether they be of different races or social classes, are theorized to promote punitive policies against those groups (Garland 2002). Second, religion could be a relevant factor, as some research suggests punitive actions grow as the population of fundamentalist religious citizens grow (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001). Third, I include a measure of state education levels to approximate cosmopolitanism, as more educated populations tend to prefer less spending on crime (Neill, Yusuf and Morris 2014). Finally, citizen ideology is an important constraint on corrections policy, as more conservative citizens may press their representatives to craft more punitive and expensive corrections policy (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001). In total, I add these relevant considerations to the specification - electoral competition, a dummy for gubernatorial election year, legislative professionalism, gubernatorial control of the budget process, Berry et al.'s (2010) measure of citizen ideology, the Gini index, unemployment, a state's population of Evangelical residents, and the number of high school diplomas awarded each year.

Electoral competition is the Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) calculation using data from Carl Klarner. It is calculated by averaging four components: the average percent winning candidates won in that year's election, the average percent margin by which the winning candidate won, the percent of seats that are uncontested, and the percent of seats that are "safe" (meaning the winning margin is 10% or more). The final measure subtracts the average of those four components from 100, meaning that higher values of this measure indicate higher levels of electoral competitiveness. Overall, it essentially captures how difficult it is to get elected in any given state. Gubernatorial election year, from Carl Klarner, is a dummy variable. Legislative professionalism

is from Bowen and Greene (2014). Gubernatorial budget power is also in this table: it is from the Book of the States and takes the value 1 if the governor retains full control over the budget-making process and 0 if the executive shares power with the legislature. Citizen ideology, from Berry et al. (2010), is a proxy for citizen ideology calculated via the percentages earned from incumbents and challengers in state Congressional districts. Additionally, this specification includes a state's Gini Index. Gini Index, obtained from Mark Frank at Sam Houston University, measures the level of inequality in each state by examining the income gap between the richest and poorest individuals. Higher levels of this index indicate more inequality. The state unemployment rate, collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is also in this equation. Finally, I include a measure of the evangelical population to the specification: the percent of evangelical residents in a state, from the Correlates of State Policy Project and Sellers (2017).

Table 2 show the negative and significant relationship between both percent Black population and percent Black state legislators is robust to all these specifications. The high R^2 appears to be due to the inclusion of state and year fixed effects. These variables must be included in this specification, however, as budgets vary significantly across both states and years. The inclusion of these fixed effects controls for any unobserved heterogeneity across states and times, allowing me to identify how corrections spending changes within states over time (Mummolo and Peterson 2018).

Table 2: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Using Bivariate Estimation

	Dependent variable:							
	Total Corrections PC				Institutions PC			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Percent Black Legislators	0.209	−0.479**	−0.363**	−0.280*	0.165	−0.350*	−0.334***	−0.254*
	(0.431)	(0.224)	(0.151)	(0.158)	(0.335)	(0.185)	(0.124)	(0.141)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−0.336***	−0.060	−0.048	−0.028	−0.303***	−0.040	−0.039	−0.023
	(0.072)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.066)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.038)
Rep. Governor			−1.571	−1.635			−1.500	−1.522
			(1.045)	(1.087)			(0.984)	(0.948)
Prop. Rep. Legislators			−13.831	−11.278			−1.921	−0.441
			(8.560)	(8.783)			(9.715)	(9.557)
Violent Crime Rate			0.005	0.010			0.0004	0.005
			(0.009)	(0.010)			(0.007)	(0.008)
Incarceration Rate			0.063***	0.065***			0.057***	0.059***
			(0.015)	(0.015)			(0.015)	(0.015)
Revenue Per Capita			4.699**	3.933**			3.344**	2.698**
			(1.971)	(1.692)			(1.432)	(1.128)
Proportion Minority			−0.348	−0.377			−0.248	−0.292
			(0.258)	(0.269)			(0.214)	(0.219)
Electoral Competition				−0.354**				−0.322**
				(0.173)				(0.147)
Gov. Election Year				0.148				0.277
				(0.310)				(0.306)
Legislative Professionalism				3.522				3.256*
				(2.449)				(1.818)
Gov. Budget Power				−2.162				−1.823
				(2.373)				(1.919)
Citizen Ideology (Berry)				−0.106				−0.149
				(0.119)				(0.094)
Gini Index				−2.824				10.309
				(26.844)				(32.415)
Unemployment				−0.913*				−0.716
				(0.487)				(0.562)
Evangelical Pop.				0.131				0.113
				(0.218)				(0.204)
Constant	66.898***				54.771***			
	(5.851)				(5.275)			
Observations	1,270	1,270	1,268	1,261	1,272	1,272	1,270	1,263
State/Year FE's	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R²	0.027	0.840	0.868	0.877	0.029	0.828	0.852	0.861
Adjusted R²	0.026	0.830	0.860	0.868	0.027	0.817	0.841	0.851
Residual Std. Error	25.658 (df = 1267)	10.705 (df = 1194)	9.748 (df = 1186)	9.473 (df = 1171)	22.308 (df = 1269)	9.665 (df = 1196)	9.011 (df = 1188)	8.757 (df = 1173)

Note: All SE's clustered by state. | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

3 Alternative Dependent Variables

Table 3 uses two alternative dependent variables from Equation 1: the percent of the total state budget on each of the three categories, or logged spending. Both logged corrections spending and the percent of the state budget devoted to corrections is negatively and significantly associated with increases in Black political representation.

Table 3: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Using Alternative Dependent Variables

	Dependent variable:					
	% Budget Corrections	% Budget Institutions	% Budget Community	Logged Total Corrections	Logged Institutions	Logged Community
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.016***	−0.017***	−0.0005	−0.007***	−0.008***	−0.002
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−0.002	−0.002	−0.0002	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Rep. Governor	−0.012	−0.004	−0.005	−0.012	−0.017	−0.064
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.082)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	−0.708*	−0.130	−0.538**	−0.130	0.096	−0.386
	(0.381)	(0.428)	(0.272)	(0.180)	(0.224)	(0.661)
Violent Crime Rate	0.0004	0.0002	0.0003*	0.0003*	0.0002	0.0004
	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)
Incarceration Rate	0.002***	0.002***	0.0002	0.001***	0.001***	0.0001
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0005)
Revenue Per Capita	0.081*	0.049	0.029	0.037	0.025	0.041
	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.047)
Proportion Minority	−0.029***	−0.021**	−0.007	−0.005	−0.004	0.001
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)
Observations	1,268	1,270	1,286	1,268	1,270	1,286
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.791	0.725	0.671	0.979	0.971	0.872
Adjusted R^2	0.777	0.706	0.649	0.978	0.969	0.864
Residual Std. Error	0.378 (df = 1186)	0.353 (df = 1188)	0.217 (df = 1204)	0.167 (df = 1186)	0.199 (df = 1188)	0.474 (df = 1204)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: All SE's
clustered by state.

Table 4 contains two additional dependent variables: capital outlay and current operations spending per capita. Corrections spending is comprised of these two components. From Kyckelhahn (2014), "capital outlay expenditures included spending on construction, renovations, and major repair of institutions; purchase of land, rights-of-way, and existing structures; title searches and related costs; and purchase of equipment having a useful life of more than 5 years." In contrast, current operations "pay for the housing of inmates in private prisons and in prisons operated by the state" (Kyckelhahn 2014). In the time period of this study, current operations comprised the vast majority of corrections spending, from approximately 64% in 1982 to 76% in 2010, whereas capital outlay expenditures ranged from about 10% in 1982 to 2% in 2010. From the table, Black legislators are able to decrease spending on current operations. While at first glance this may not seem intuitive - as Black legislators should be more likely to decrease spending on the physical construction of carceral institutions like prisons (Yates and Fording 2005) - considering current operations are the vast majority of corrections spending, it is the category Black legislators are able to move the needle the most.

Table 4: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Using Capital Outlay and Current Operations Spending

	Dependent variable:	
	Capital Outlay PC	Current Operations PC
	(1)	(2)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.0001	−0.001***
	(0.0001)	(0.0003)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−0.00004	0.00002
	(0.00004)	(0.0001)
Rep. Governor	−0.001*	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	0.009**	−0.031*
	(0.004)	(0.016)
Violent Crime Rate	0.00001	−0.00001
	(0.00000)	(0.00002)
Incarceration Rate	−0.00000	0.0001**
	(0.00001)	(0.00003)
Revenue Per Capita	0.002**	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Proportion Minority	−0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0001)	(0.0005)
Observations	1,286	1,286
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
R^2	0.243	0.930
Adjusted R^2	0.192	0.926
Residual Std. Error (df = 1204)	0.009	0.014

Note: All SE's clustered by state.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Finally, Table 5 uses two separate dependent variables in the estimation of Equation 1: spending per inmate and logged spending per inmate. While Table 4 highlights the negative association between Black state representatives and current operations spending, it does not appear that relationship is driven by decreases in funding to each inmate as seen in Table 5.

Table 5: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Using Spending Per Inmate

	Dependent variable:	
	Spending Per Inmate	Logged Spending Per Inmate
	(1)	(2)
Percent Black Legislators	71.887	0.00002
	(63.453)	(0.003)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−58.337**	−0.001
	(27.938)	(0.001)
Rep. Governor	−1,316.157**	−0.038*
	(624.415)	(0.021)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	14,147.260***	0.357**
	(4,023.084)	(0.153)
Violent Crime Rate	1.336	0.00001
	(2.943)	(0.0001)
Incarceration Rate	−16.772***	−0.001***
	(5.140)	(0.0002)
Revenue Per Capita	1,195.493**	0.058**
	(577.972)	(0.025)
Proportion Minority	79.600	−0.001
	(118.544)	(0.005)
Observations	1,268	1,268
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓
R^2	0.798	0.875
Adjusted R^2	0.784	0.866
Residual Std. Error (df = 1186)	4,755.087	0.164

Note: All SE's clustered by state.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4 Alternative Independent Variables

4.1 Proportion Black

Table 6 uses an alternative independent variable: the percent of the state's population that is Black. This simple demographic variable is used in other studies seeking to understand the effect of social control and racial threat on punitive policies. However, the correlation between percent Black and percent Black state legislators is far too high (approximately 0.9) to include them both in the specification. Nevertheless, I include the same specification in the main body of the paper using only percent of the state's population that is Black here. The results below comport with those from the main body of the paper: it appears there is no relationship between the population of Blacks and corrections spending per capita of any kind.

Table 6: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Using Percent of Population that is Black as Alternative Independent Variable

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black	−0.128	−0.061	−0.061
	(0.807)	(0.629)	(0.286)
Rep. Governor	−2.362*	−2.138*	−0.181
	(1.376)	(1.186)	(0.885)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	−16.030	−5.445	−9.903
	(9.926)	(10.231)	(7.777)
Violent Crime Rate	0.014	0.008	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Incarceration Rate	0.059***	0.054***	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Revenue Per Capita	6.067***	4.369***	1.637**
	(2.036)	(1.514)	(0.784)
Observations	1,352	1,354	1,370
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.874	0.854	0.651
Adjusted R^2	0.866	0.845	0.629
Residual Std. Error	10.420 (df = 1270)	9.469 (df = 1272)	5.232 (df = 1288)

Note: All SE's clustered by state.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.2 Unified Republican Government

It may be the case that whether the government is divided influences how much the legislature is able to change the budget. Table 7 is the same estimate as Equation 1, except it includes a measure of unified Republican government in place of Republican governor. The results are not significant (save the slightly negative coefficient on the proportion Republican legislators variable) and the percent Black legislators variable remains significant and negative.

Table 7: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Using Alternative Operationalizations of Partisanship

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.361**	−0.336***	−0.039
	(0.151)	(0.122)	(0.062)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−0.051	−0.042	−0.011
	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.021)
Unified Rep. Gov't	0.365	−0.246	0.593
	(1.653)	(1.812)	(0.953)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	−14.900*	−2.157	−11.984
	(7.938)	(9.464)	(7.924)
Violent Crime Rate	0.006	0.001	0.006
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Incarceration Rate	0.062***	0.056***	0.006
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.007)
Revenue Per Capita	4.648**	3.283**	1.311*
	(2.016)	(1.476)	(0.781)
Percent Minority	−0.372	−0.271	−0.090
	(0.267)	(0.225)	(0.122)
Observations	1,268	1,270	1,286
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.868	0.851	0.629
Adjusted R^2	0.859	0.841	0.605
Residual Std. Error	9.773 (df = 1186)	9.035 (df = 1188)	5.183 (df = 1204)

Note: All SE's clustered by state. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

5 Interacting Partisan Politics and Social Control

Table 8 interacts a state's percent of Black state legislators with a dummy for unified Republican government and a state's percent of Blacks that voted with a Republican dummy variable.

Table 8: Partisan Politics, Social Control, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Interacting Unified Republican Government and Percent Blacks that Voted or Percent Black Legislators

	Dependent variable:					
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.425***	−0.344***	−0.090	−0.377**	−0.327**	−0.059
	(0.158)	(0.133)	(0.076)	(0.159)	(0.140)	(0.083)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−0.058	−0.039	−0.021	−0.052	−0.042	−0.012
	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.021)
Unified Rep. Gov't	−1.022	0.046	−0.953	0.722	0.134	0.704
	(2.326)	(2.546)	(1.609)	(2.037)	(2.564)	(1.254)
Violent Crime Rate	0.004	0.0004	0.004	0.004	0.0002	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Incarceration Rate	0.057***	0.055***	0.001	0.056***	0.055***	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Revenue Per Capita	4.698**	3.293**	1.350*	4.689**	3.286**	1.349*
	(1.994)	(1.472)	(0.803)	(1.996)	(1.471)	(0.807)
Proportion Minority	−0.398	−0.274	−0.113	−0.390	−0.272	−0.106
	(0.261)	(0.222)	(0.127)	(0.264)	(0.224)	(0.128)
Perc. Blacks that Voted * Unified Rep. Gov't	0.014	−0.017	0.028			
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)			
Perc. Black Leg. * Unified Rep. Gov't				−0.205	−0.077	−0.130
				(0.274)	(0.285)	(0.106)
Observations	1,268	1,270	1,286	1,268	1,270	1,286
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R²	0.867	0.851	0.622	0.867	0.851	0.623
Adjusted R²	0.858	0.841	0.597	0.858	0.841	0.598
Residual Std. Error	9.815 (df = 1186)	9.036 (df = 1188)	5.233 (df = 1204)	9.806 (df = 1186)	9.035 (df = 1188)	5.227 (df = 1204)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: All SE's clustered by state.

6   Adding Quadratic Terms

Table 9 adds a squared percent Black state population and a squared percent Black legislators term to the estimation.

Table 9: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Adding Quadratic Terms

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.264	−0.099	−0.191
	(0.379)	(0.362)	(0.179)
Percent Black Leg. Squared	−0.004	−0.010	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.007)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−0.144	−0.156	0.003
	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.060)
Percent Blacks that Voted Squared	0.001	0.002	−0.0002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Rep. Governor	−1.602	−1.537	−0.013
	(1.058)	(0.986)	(0.968)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	−13.235	−0.743	−11.799
	(8.051)	(9.311)	(7.917)
Violent Crime Rate	0.005	−0.0001	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Incarceration Rate	0.064***	0.058***	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Revenue Per Capita	4.738**	3.408**	1.274*
	(1.968)	(1.433)	(0.741)
Proportion Minority	−0.340	−0.231	−0.101
	(0.253)	(0.211)	(0.131)
Observations	1,268	1,270	1,286
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.869	0.852	0.630
Adjusted R^2	0.859	0.842	0.604
Residual Std. Error	9.751 (df = 1184)	9.006 (df = 1186)	5.187 (df = 1202)

Note: All SE's clustered by state. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

7 South and Non-South Comparison

To account for potential variation in effects across Southern and non-Southern states, I conducted multiple additional tests. First, I subsetted the data into two groups, Southern and non-Southern states. The analysis in the South subset is below in Table 10. States included in this specification are: Alabama; Arkansas; Florida; Georgia; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maryland; Mississippi; Missouri; North Carolina; Oklahoma; South Carolina; Tennessee; Texas; Virginia; West Virginia.

Table 10: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation using a South Subset

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	-0.421^{**}	-0.409^{**}	-0.014
	(0.206)	(0.177)	(0.120)
Percent Blacks that Voted	0.092	0.061	0.030
	(0.115)	(0.101)	(0.055)
Rep. Governor	-1.058	-0.228	-0.896
	(1.583)	(1.716)	(1.692)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	-31.838	-16.026	-14.668
	(28.569)	(27.421)	(15.059)
Violent Crime Rate	-0.003	-0.003	0.0003
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.007)
Incarceration Rate	0.025	0.018	0.006
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.010)
Revenue Per Capita	7.989^{**}	7.092^{**}	0.884
	(3.389)	(3.136)	(1.671)
Proportion Minority	0.510	0.374	0.132
	(0.427)	(0.417)	(0.194)
Observations	428	428	432
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.855	0.775	0.747
Adjusted R^2	0.836	0.746	0.714
Residual Std. Error	7.852 (df = 378)	7.368 (df = 378)	5.071 (df = 382)

Note: All SE's clustered by state. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Next, I estimated the regression on a subset of non-Southern states, shown in Table 11.

Table 11: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Using a non-South Subset

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.200	−0.084	−0.134
	(0.168)	(0.131)	(0.100)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−0.079	−0.070	−0.010
	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.023)
Rep. Governor	−2.109	−2.402**	0.392
	(1.368)	(1.110)	(1.244)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	−8.129	5.963	−12.779
	(12.588)	(13.604)	(12.266)
Violent Crime Rate	0.002	−0.003	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Incarceration Rate	0.110***	0.108***	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.007)
Revenue Per Capita	4.722**	3.410**	1.238
	(2.061)	(1.438)	(0.815)
Proportion Minority	−0.666**	−0.402*	−0.252
	(0.295)	(0.219)	(0.193)
Observations	840	842	854
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.880	0.874	0.559
Adjusted R^2	0.870	0.863	0.523
Residual Std. Error	10.296 (df = 774)	9.403 (df = 776)	5.200 (df = 788)

Note: All SE's clustered by state.   *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

Percent Black legislators is significant in neither specification, though that could be due to decreases in sample size. Next, I estimated the sample specification using a South fixed effect rather than subsetting, to maintain the larger sample size. The results are in Table 12 below.

Table 12: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Adding a South Fixed Effect

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.363**	−0.334***	−0.041
	(0.151)	(0.124)	(0.063)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−0.048	−0.039	−0.011
	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.021)
Rep. Governor	−1.571	−1.500	−0.017
	(1.045)	(0.984)	(0.975)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	−13.831	−1.921	−11.185
	(8.560)	(9.715)	(7.688)
Violent Crime Rate	0.005	0.0004	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Incarceration Rate	0.063***	0.057***	0.006
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Revenue Per Capita	4.699**	3.344**	1.299*
	(1.971)	(1.432)	(0.754)
Proportion Minority	−0.348	−0.248	−0.090
	(0.258)	(0.214)	(0.128)
Observations	1,268	1,270	1,286
State/Year/South Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.868	0.852	0.629
Adjusted R^2	0.860	0.841	0.604
Residual Std. Error	9.748 (df = 1186)	9.011 (df = 1188)	5.186 (df = 1204)

Note: All SE's $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$
clustered by state.

Table 13 interacts percent Black legislators with a South dummy. Because the South dummy is perfectly predicted by the state fixed effects, the analysis below only includes year fixed effects.

Table 13: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Interacting South Dummy with Independent Variable

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.303	0.116	−0.413**
	(0.339)	(0.337)	(0.168)
South Dummy	−5.209	−2.447	−2.526
	(5.693)	(4.760)	(2.990)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−0.054	−0.081*	0.026
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.031)
Rep. Governor	−3.831***	−2.451*	−1.326
	(1.445)	(1.267)	(1.104)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	−2.366	0.466	−2.581
	(9.751)	(9.272)	(5.102)
Violent Crime Rate	0.022**	0.013**	0.010**
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Incarceration Rate	0.049**	0.048**	−0.0003
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.011)
Revenue Per Capita	9.494***	8.594***	0.918***
	(0.717)	(0.833)	(0.336)
Proportion Minority	0.283	0.291	−0.014
	(0.188)	(0.194)	(0.106)
Perc. Black Leg. * South	−0.271	−0.727	0.464
	(0.623)	(0.470)	(0.310)
Observations	1,268	1,270	1,286
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.683	0.685	0.185
Adjusted R^2	0.674	0.676	0.162
Residual Std. Error	14.860 (df = 1231)	12.876 (df = 1233)	7.547 (df = 1249)

Note: All SE's clustered by state.   *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

To illustrate these dynamics, though the interaction term is not significant, I plotted the marginal effect of this interaction term in Figure 1. The figure highlights a similar negative relationship: as the percent of Black legislators increases in both the South and not in the South, total corrections spending per capita decreases. This provides suggestive evidence that these dynamics are not solely confined to the South.


Figure 1: Marginal effects plot from Table 13.

8   Adding Additional Relevant Controls

Table 14 adds the number of high school diplomas awarded each year to the specification reported in Table 2. This measure is from the National Center for Education Statistics and represents the total number of students in a state who received a high school diploma during the school year and subsequent summer school. The data are missing for some observations in years prior to 1996; and are not available for the years 1981-1986.

Table 14: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Adding Additional Controls and High School Diplomas

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.199	−0.192	−0.015
	(0.184)	(0.166)	(0.109)
Percent Blacks that Voted	0.023	0.019	0.004
	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.028)
Rep. Governor	−1.363	−1.746	0.344
	(1.205)	(1.097)	(1.281)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	−21.948**	−3.911	−17.484
	(10.500)	(11.862)	(12.153)
Violent Crime Rate	0.020*	0.012	0.007
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Incarceration Rate	0.064***	0.060***	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.007)
Revenue Per Capita	3.448**	2.290**	1.145
	(1.493)	(0.996)	(0.709)
Proportion Minority	−0.805**	−0.612**	−0.193
	(0.396)	(0.306)	(0.173)
Electoral Competition	−0.400*	−0.334**	−0.070
	(0.209)	(0.168)	(0.125)
Gov. Election Year	0.523	0.486	0.050
	(0.380)	(0.412)	(0.252)
Legislative Professionalism	1.994	2.536**	−0.357
	(1.347)	(1.215)	(1.065)
Gov. Budget Power	−2.863	−2.910	−0.057
	(2.313)	(1.949)	(1.389)
Citizen Ideology (Berry)	−0.249*	−0.252**	0.007
	(0.139)	(0.114)	(0.048)
Gini Index	32.780	28.416	3.471
	(37.532)	(43.227)	(22.536)
Unemployment	−1.619***	−1.335**	−0.256
	(0.526)	(0.560)	(0.296)
Evangelical Pop.	0.076	0.108	−0.035
	(0.214)	(0.226)	(0.086)
# High School Diplomas	0.0001	0.0001	0.00002
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.00003)
Observations	948	950	966
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.893	0.875	0.651
Adjusted R^2	0.882	0.862	0.617
Residual Std. Error	8.471 (df = 860)	8.029 (df = 862)	5.193 (df = 878)

Note: All SE's clustered by state.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15 replaces Republican governor and proportion Republican legislators with the Berry et al. (2010) measure of government ideology.

Table 15: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Adding Additional Controls (and Government Ideology)

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.313*	−0.258*	−0.061
	(0.166)	(0.147)	(0.088)
Percent Blacks that Voted	−0.027	−0.023	−0.005
	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.022)
Gov't Ideology (Berry)	0.067**	0.040	0.024*
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.014)
Violent Crime Rate	0.009	0.005	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Incarceration Rate	0.063***	0.059***	0.004
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.006)
Revenue Per Capita	3.893**	2.631**	1.206
	(1.658)	(1.116)	(0.792)
Proportion Minority	−0.419	−0.314	−0.091
	(0.264)	(0.224)	(0.121)
Electoral Competition	−0.376**	−0.328**	−0.063
	(0.173)	(0.148)	(0.100)
Gov. Election Year	0.146	0.288	−0.131
	(0.303)	(0.304)	(0.183)
Legislative Professionalism	3.713	3.317*	0.058
	(2.486)	(1.846)	(1.053)
Gov. Budget Power	−2.289	−1.864	−0.459
	(2.340)	(1.928)	(1.200)
Citizen Ideology (Berry)	−0.116	−0.163*	0.058
	(0.124)	(0.093)	(0.051)
Gini Index	−4.090	12.269	−17.180
	(25.983)	(31.442)	(18.373)
Unemployment	−0.819*	−0.689	−0.107
	(0.487)	(0.561)	(0.276)
Evangelical Pop.	0.179	0.116	0.076
	(0.230)	(0.196)	(0.065)
Observations	1,261	1,263	1,279
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.877	0.861	0.631
Adjusted R^2	0.867	0.850	0.604
Residual Std. Error	9.474 (df = 1172)	8.759 (df = 1174)	5.200 (df = 1190)

Note: All SE's clustered by state.   *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

9 Adding a Lagged Dependent Variable

Table 16 adds a lagged dependent variable (either the per capita spending on total, institutional, or community corrections per capita) to the specification in place of the two-way fixed effects estimation.

Table 16: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Adding a Lagged Dependent Variable

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.099**	−0.091**	−0.016
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.025)
Percent Blacks that Voted	0.011	0.014	−0.004
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.006)
Rep. Governor	−0.507	−0.282	−0.297**
	(0.345)	(0.350)	(0.144)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	0.090	0.670	−0.312
	(1.105)	(1.086)	(0.498)
Violent Crime Rate	0.001	0.002	0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0003)
Incarceration Rate	0.008***	0.005*	0.003**
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Revenue Per Capita	0.911***	0.998***	0.123***
	(0.298)	(0.277)	(0.036)
Proportion Minority	0.038	0.038	−0.003
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.011)
Lagged Total PC	0.912***		
	(0.038)		
Lagged Institutions PC		0.885***	
		(0.042)	
Lagged Community PC			0.896***
			(0.019)
Constant	−2.515***	−2.455***	0.025
	(0.716)	(0.785)	(0.359)
Observations	1,211	1,214	1,238
R^2	0.931	0.910	0.851
Adjusted R^2	0.930	0.909	0.850
Residual Std. Error	6.895 (df = 1201)	6.834 (df = 1204)	3.181 (df = 1228)

Note: All SE's clustered by state.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

10 Subsetting to Different Time Periods

One potential concern for this analysis could be the changing nature and attitude towards criminal justice over this time period. Namely, in the beginning

Table 17 subsets the data to only include years from 1983-1994.

Table 17: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Using Data from 1983-1994

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.150	−0.326	0.117
	(0.451)	(0.423)	(0.185)
Percent Voters that are Black	−0.265	−0.444	0.142
	(0.385)	(0.310)	(0.211)
Rep. Governor	−0.707	−0.373	−0.132
	(1.169)	(0.799)	(0.615)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	−3.376	10.385	−8.226
	(13.218)	(15.509)	(6.384)
Violent Crime Rate	0.017	0.008	0.011*
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Incarceration Rate	0.015	0.019	−0.009
	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.010)
Revenue Per Capita	13.059***	10.374***	2.568*
	(2.570)	(2.745)	(1.327)
Percent Minority	0.224	0.153	−0.009
	(0.362)	(0.330)	(0.148)
Observations	472	472	472
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.916	0.902	0.747
Adjusted R^2	0.903	0.887	0.707
Residual Std. Error (df = 407)	8.021	7.515	3.499

Note: All SE's clustered by state. $^*p<0.1; ^{**}p<0.05; ^{***}p<0.01$

Table 18 only includes data from 1995 to 2011.

Table 18: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Using Data from 1995-2011

	Dependent variable:		
	Total Corrections PC	Institutions PC	Community PC
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Percent Black Legislators	−0.362***	−0.223**	−0.142*
	(0.095)	(0.109)	(0.075)
Percent Voters that are Black	−0.323	−0.239	−0.080
	(0.228)	(0.237)	(0.155)
Rep. Governor	−0.436	−1.374	0.891
	(1.222)	(1.433)	(1.577)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	−18.057**	2.483	−20.392
	(8.360)	(12.504)	(13.860)
Violent Crime Rate	0.008	0.010	−0.002
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Incarceration Rate	0.040***	0.035**	0.006
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.008)
Revenue Per Capita	3.178**	2.224**	0.950
	(1.311)	(0.945)	(0.624)
Percent Minority	−1.817***	−0.969*	−0.845*
	(0.492)	(0.499)	(0.448)
Observations	796	798	814
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.900	0.865	0.711
Adjusted R^2	0.891	0.851	0.683
Residual Std. Error	7.709 (df = 724)	7.937 (df = 726)	4.999 (df = 742)

Note: All SE's clustered by state.   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

11 Does the Incarceration Rate Increase as Corrections Spending Increases?

Table 19 uses the incarceration rate in year $t + 1$ as the dependent variable and the total corrections spending per capita as the independent variable. Spending is a significant and positive predictor of the incarceration rate in the following year. This helps to bolster the claim that by limiting spending, Black legislators are limiting the amount that can be spent on incarceration and other policy outcomes.

Table 19: Descriptive and Social Incorporation, and Corrections Spending: An OLS Estimation Using Incarceration Rate as the Dependent Variable

	Dependent variable:
	Total Corrections PC
Total Corrections PC	1.373***
	(0.363)
Percent Black Legislators	0.643
	(1.336)
Percent Blacks that Voted	0.330
	(1.424)
Rep. Governor	8.932
	(5.611)
Prop. Rep. Legislators	204.331***
	(63.973)
Violent Crime Rate	0.098***
	(0.036)
Revenue Per Capita	−5.624
	(3.948)
Proportion Minority	3.678**
	(1.743)
Observations	1,220
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓
R^2	0.922
Adjusted R^2	0.916
Residual Std. Error	43.680 (df = 1139)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
clustered by state.

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