

Online Appendix for “State Parties, the Democratic National Convention, and Civil Rights Liberalism”

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Table A1: Vaughan Support (OLS)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Log Pop	0.24*										0.20*	0.27*
	(0.06)										(0.09)	(0.11)
Urban		1.23*									-0.41	-0.51
		(0.53)									(0.65)	(0.69)
Black			9.60*								-11.25+	1.12
			(3.32)								(5.75)	(4.39)
↑ Black %				0.21+							0.30*	0.30*
				(0.11)							(0.11)	(0.11)
↑ Black Percentage					37.77*						46.30*	
					(8.11)						(13.98)	
Union						2.54*					0.73	0.26
						(0.80)					(0.85)	(0.99)
Jewish							5.59*				1.11	1.48
							(2.65)				(2.86)	(3.01)
Catholic								-0.10				
								(0.73)				
College									2.27			
									(8.93)			
Pres Vote										0.76		
										(2.00)		
Constant	-3.07*	-0.35	0.15	0.26*	0.11	-0.39	0.28*	0.41*	0.25	0.01	-2.60*	-3.57*
	(0.91)	(0.33)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.20)	(0.56)	(0.99)	(1.19)	(1.37)
Adjusted R ²	0.310	0.129	0.197	0.069	0.408	0.233	0.103	-0.034	-0.032	-0.029	0.489	0.429
N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31

Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05

Table A2: Vaughan Support (Logit)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Log Pop	1.34* (0.48)										2.71 (1.69)
Urban		5.92* (2.85)									-11.14 (12.01)
Black			44.35* (18.48)								5.62 (32.65)
↑ Black %				0.97 (0.62)							2.83+ (1.59)
↑ Black Percentage					270.31* (105.44)						
Union						13.46* (5.36)					-3.67 (14.29)
Jewish							47.99+ (26.17)				76.40 (95.80)
Catholic								-0.41 (3.01)			
College									9.55 (36.45)		
Pres Vote										3.22 (8.29)	
Constant	-19.96* (7.07)	-4.09* (1.82)	-1.58* (0.62)	-1.08* (0.54)	-2.29* (0.77)	-4.73* (1.79)	-1.26* (0.56)	-0.36 (0.80)	-1.05 (2.30)	-2.05 (4.11)	-35.19+ (21.38)
Pseudo R ²	0.283	0.126	0.172	0.077	0.386	0.215	0.135	0.000	0.002	0.004	0.524
N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31

Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05

Table A3: Biemiller Support (OLS)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Log Pop	0.25* (0.05)										0.30* (0.09)
Urban		0.96+ (0.47)									-0.37 (0.64)
Black			7.64* (2.99)								-2.35 (5.71)
↑ Black %				-0.05 (0.11)							
↑ Black Percentage					17.85+ (8.79)						3.02 (13.88)
Union						1.60* (0.76)					0.12 (0.85)
Jewish							4.62+ (2.35)				0.02 (2.83)
Catholic								0.06 (0.64)			
College									1.33 (7.84)		
Pres Vote										-2.22 (1.71)	
Constant	-2.94* (0.72)	0.04 (0.29)	0.43* (0.10)	0.65* (0.10)	0.48* (0.10)	0.12 (0.24)	0.52* (0.09)	0.60* (0.17)	0.53 (0.49)	1.71+ (0.85)	-3.44* (1.18)
Adjusted R ²	0.439	0.096	0.156	-0.025	0.094	0.104	0.088	-0.034	-0.033	0.022	0.345
Observations	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31

Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05




Figure A1: Vaughan Amendment and State Demographic Characteristics I







Figure A2: Vaughan Amendment and State Demographic Characteristics II




Figure A3: Vaughan Amendment and State Demographic Characteristics (Linear Fit) I




Figure A4: Vaughan Amendment and State Demographic Characteristics (Linear Fit) II









Figure A5: Biemiller Amendment and State Demographic Characteristics I




Figure A6: Biemiller Amendment and State Demographic Characteristics II




Figure A7: Biemiller Amendment and State Demographic Characteristics (Linear Fit) I




Figure A8: Biemiller Amendment and State Demographic Characteristics (Linear Fit) II

The 1948 Coalitions in Descriptive Terms

Table A4 places each non-southern state delegation into a cell based on its votes on the Vaughan and Biemiller proposals, showing there was a pro-civil rights core, a second group that supported changing the platform language but not unseating Mississippi, and a third group that simply supported neither.²³

Table A4: The Coalitions in 1948

	Support Vaughan	Oppose Vaughan
Support Biemiller	CA, CT, IA, IL, MI, MN, NY, OH, PA, WA, WI	CO, IN, KS, MA, NJ, SD, VT, WY
Oppose Biemiller	NV	AZ, ID, ME, MT, ND, NE, NH, NM, OR, RI, UT

Thirteen state party delegations voted in favor of the Vaughan amendment. Twenty-one state delegations offered majority support for the Biemiller amendment; 15 were unanimous in their support. Twelve states voted in favor of both the Vaughan and Biemiller amendments. Statistically, the delegations that supported both proposals were from states that were more populous (mean: 6,579,034) and had larger increases in their Black population percentage between 1940 and 1950 (mean: 1.4 percentage point increase). Some states in the pro-civil rights core exemplified these tendencies. New York, for example, had a population of 14,830,192 in 1950 and saw a 2 percentage point increase in its Black population between 1940 and 1950. There is also other evidence that New York Democrats played an important role in the party's transition towards racial liberalism, including the party's support of state-level fair employment legislation and the influence in New York City of what the historian Martha Biondi calls a "Black liberal-left alliance" in advocating for civil rights (2003, 10; see also Chen 2009 and Schickler 2016).

Others, though, are more curious. Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin had total populations of 2,621,073, 2,982,483, and 3,434,575, respectively, and their Black populations increased by 0.1, 0.1, and 0.4 percentage points, respectively. Connecticut, too, fits this pattern, with a population of 2,007,280 and a 0.7 percentage point increase in its Black population, although its proximity to New York City makes it perhaps less surprising. Delegations from these relatively smaller, less racially diverse states in the upper Midwest nonetheless played a key role in the national party's embrace of racial liberalism, alongside more prototypical states like California, Illinois, and New York. Minnesota is perhaps the most interesting case. In 1950, Minnesota's Black population, rounded to the second decimal place, was zero percent: Of 2,982,483 residents, only 14,022 were African Americans. Yet Minnesota's party was at the fore of a push for a substantially greater commitment to civil rights among national Democrats. There are a few factors unique to Minnesota that might partially account for this, including its three-party system and Scandinavian heritage (Delton 2002).

Delegations that supported strengthening the platform but not unseating Mississippi had a mean state population size of 2,251,434 and a mean increase in the Black population size of 0.4 percentage points. There were a few northeastern delegations that were willing to support this but not unseating Mississippi (Massachusetts and New Jersey), while a few small Great Plains delegations like South Dakota and Wyoming also fit into this category. The latter provide greater evidence of the role of smaller, whiter states in the civil rights realignment, while the former suggest some variation in the intensity of civil rights commitment among northeastern states. State delegations that supported neither proposal had a mean population size of 818,609 and a mean increase in the Black population size of 0.2 percentage points. Although it is not necessarily surprising that these states were more reticent to support civil rights liberalism, the fact that size more than region (putting aside the South) is more predictive of opposition is notable.