Paths toward coalition defection: Democracies and withdrawal from the Iraq War

25 April 2019

Supplementary Document

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1 Explanatory Note

This document supplements the article ‘Paths toward coalition defection: Democracies and withdrawal from the Iraq War’ (*European Journal of International Security*). The first section provides descriptive statistics and information on the calibration approaches used to create the explanatory conditions and the outcome condition (Tables S1–S2, Figures S1–S3). Drawing on quantitative data, the direct method of calibration was used for the conditions leftist partisanship, low commitment, and fatalities (Table S1). The conditions leadership change, upcoming elections, and the outcome early withdrawal are based on a qualitative assignment of values (Table S2). The second section entails additional documentation for the empirical analysis, including the analysis of necessary conditions for the non-outcome, truth tables with logical remainders, and parsimonious, intermediate, and complex solution terms for the outcome and the non-outcome (Tables S3–S7). The third section documents several robustness tests, including an alternative crisp-set analysis, a restrictive coding of leadership change, a negative coding of the case Romania-2 (Popescu-Tariceanu), and an alternative threshold for the coding of upcoming elections (Tables S8–S11).

2 Calibration Strategy and Descriptive Statistics

Table S1. Calibration Thresholds for Explanatory Conditions (Direct Method)



Figure S1. Histograms of Raw Data



Table S2. Calibration of Explanatory Conditions and Outcome (Qualitative)



Figure S2. Histograms of Fuzzy-Set Membership Scores



Figure S3. Raw Data and Calibrated Fuzzy Sets



3 Additional Documentation

Table S3. Analysis of Necessary Conditions for Non-Outcome



Table S4. Truth Table for Early Withdrawal, with Logical Remainders



Table S5. Parsimonious, Intermediate, and Complex Solution Terms for Early Withdrawal



Table S6. Truth Table for Non-Outcome, with Logical Remainders



Table S7. Parsimonious and Complex Solution Terms for Non-Outcome



4 Robustness Tests

Table S8. Crisp-Set Analysis

For this robustness test all fuzzy-sets conditions were transformed into crisp-set conditions (dichotomized). This yields a nearly identical solution with increased measures of fit, an additional path (Path 5), and a specification of Path 3 (for a direct comparison, see the intermediate solution in Table S5).



Table S9. Restrictive Coding of Leadership Change

For this robustness test all instances of leadership change without elections were coded negatively. In total, this affected 9 out of 22 cases of leadership change (e.g. in the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown succeeding Tony Blair as Prime Minister). The restrictive coding procedure yields substantively similar results when compared to the main analysis (see Table S5).



Table S10. Negative Coding of Romania-2

For this alternative analysis, Romania-2 (Popescu-Tariceanu) was coded negatively on the outcome (see manuscript for discussion). Apart from slight decreases in unique coverage for the respective paths, this yields nearly identical results (compare Table S5).



Table S11. Alternative Threshold for Upcoming Elections (6 Months)

This robustness test applies a more inclusive threshold for upcoming elections, counting all instances with equal to or less than six months distance as instances of upcoming elections (≤ 180 days = 1, ≥ 181 days = 0). The change of calibration thresholds slightly decreases coverage, but the substantive patterns of all solution terms remain identical (compare Table S5).

