

# A Supporting Information

## Question Wording

Wording for the key dependent variables. All are on five point strongly agree to strongly disagree scale. All were presented in random order.

- Legal Realism: Judges' values and political views have little to do with how they decide cases before the U.S. Supreme Court.
- Legal Realism: Judges' party affiliations have little to do with how they decide cases before the U.S. Supreme Court.
- Legal Realism: The U.S. Supreme Court makes its decisions on a case-by-case basis, so it does not really make sense to think of it as either liberal or conservative.
- Perceptions of Politicization: Supreme Court judges are little more than politicians in robes.
- Perceptions of Politicization: The justices of the Supreme Court can be trusted to tell us why they actually decide the way they do rather than hiding some ulterior motives for their decisions.
- Perceptions of Politicization: Judges may say that their decisions are based on the law and the Constitution, but in many cases, judges are really basing their decisions on their own personal beliefs.
- Legitimacy: The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced.
- Legitimacy: The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics.
- Legitimacy: The U.S. Supreme Court ought to be made less independent so that it listens a lot more to what the people want.
- More Information: Thank you very much for participating in this survey. We hope you found some of the issues interesting: Which of the following topics on the survey, if

any, would you be most interested in learning more about? Please select up to two. (Ideas for restructuring the courts, Ideas about control over filling judicial vacancies as a campaign issue, Ideas about thanking essential workers, Ideas about changing zoning and allowing multifamily housing, Ideas about governors and using emergency powers in response to Covid-19, None of the above)

**Text in the control condition from the underlying experiment.** The present study uses only participants assigned to this condition:

“As you may or may not recall, after the decisions, some commentators explained that seven out of the nine Justices rejected the President’s argument that presidents are immune from subpoenas while in office. The Court allowed the investigations to continue subject to other disputes and arguments about evidence in the lower courts. This means that no documents will be turned over to investigators for now, although they may be later depending on lower court proceedings. Had you heard anything about these cases before now?”

### **Political Information Questions**

- Which party currently has the most members in the U.S. Senate? (Democrats, Republicans, Other / Neither / None of the Above)
- What job or political office does John Roberts hold? (Chief Justice, FBI Director, U.S. Senator, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce, None of the above)
- What job or political office does Mark Esper hold? (Chief Justice, FBI Director, U.S. Senator, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce, None of the above)
- What is Medicare? (A program run by the U.S. federal government to pay for old people’s health care, A program run by state governments to provide health care to poor people, A private health insurance plan sold to individuals in all 50 states, A private, non-profit organization that runs free health clinics)

## Additional Analysis

Bivariate version of results in Figure 1. This plot also includes additional subgroups of interest although the error bars are quite large as the subgroups are quite small.




Figure A1: Bivariate Estimates: Effects of “open seat” condition (being a post Sept 18th respondent) on key DVs by party. Each panel shows the estimated effect of being a “post” respondent. The Legitimacy, Politicized, and Realism effects are standardized continuous effect estimates from bivariate OLS regressions. The Court Reform and Court Appointments results are estimates from bivariate linear probability model. All estimates are relative to the “pre” respondents.

## Model Results: Full Estimates Underlying Figure 1 with Logit Equivalents for Linear Probability Estimates in Figure

Full model for “all respondents” results in Figure 1 plus logit versions of the binary DVs (linear approximations reported in main text/figure).

Table A1: Change in Key DVs: All Respondents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Realism	Politicized	Legit	Reform Info	Appts Info	Reform Info Logit	Appts Info Logit
Post Observations	-0.096 (0.107)	-0.060 (0.113)	-0.159 (0.110)	0.019 (0.046)	-0.001 (0.044)	0.098 (0.273)	0.019 (0.291)
Partisanship	-0.050* (0.022)	0.016 (0.023)	-0.015 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.067 (0.057)	-0.047 (0.059)
Political Info	0.201** (0.043)	0.031 (0.046)	0.106* (0.045)	0.012 (0.019)	0.048** (0.018)	0.066 (0.112)	0.319** (0.121)
College Degree	-0.256* (0.119)	-0.110 (0.126)	-0.005 (0.123)	0.045 (0.051)	0.072 (0.049)	0.267 (0.293)	0.433 (0.309)
Female	0.008 (0.112)	-0.114 (0.119)	0.014 (0.115)	-0.079 (0.048)	0.014 (0.046)	-0.474 <sup>+</sup> (0.288)	0.082 (0.305)
Age	0.003 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.021* (0.009)	-0.016 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)
White	-0.010 (0.116)	0.016 (0.124)	-0.205 <sup>+</sup> (0.120)	0.023 (0.050)	-0.073 (0.048)	0.097 (0.299)	-0.463 (0.311)
Homeowner	-0.254* (0.116)	0.049 (0.123)	-0.175 (0.120)	-0.018 (0.050)	0.101* (0.048)	-0.113 (0.299)	0.691* (0.325)
Constant	-0.060 (0.221)	0.181 (0.235)	-0.306 (0.228)	0.419** (0.095)	0.191* (0.091)	-0.068 (0.567)	-1.531* (0.610)
Observations	356	356	357	358	358	358	358

Standard errors in parentheses

Models: 1-3 are OLS on standardized DVs, 4-5 linear estimates with dichotomous DVs, 6-7 logit on the same DVs.

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Full model for Democrats results in Figure 1 plus logit versions of the binary DVs (linear approximations reported in main text/figure).

Table A2: Change in Key DVs: Democrats

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Realism	Politicized	Legit	Reform Info	Appts Info	Reform Info Logit	Appts Info Logit
Post Observations	-0.121 (0.161)	-0.091 (0.175)	-0.353* (0.162)	0.174* (0.068)	0.036 (0.068)	1.015* (0.399)	0.232 (0.400)
Political Info	0.234** (0.061)	0.062 (0.067)	0.126* (0.062)	0.037 (0.026)	0.050+ (0.026)	0.264 (0.165)	0.307+ (0.161)
College Degree	-0.093 (0.173)	-0.035 (0.188)	0.121 (0.174)	0.102 (0.073)	0.039 (0.073)	0.622 (0.424)	0.223 (0.433)
Female	0.169 (0.171)	0.085 (0.186)	-0.079 (0.172)	-0.096 (0.072)	-0.012 (0.072)	-0.493 (0.424)	-0.085 (0.425)
Age	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.010+ (0.005)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.027* (0.013)	0.001 (0.013)
White	0.089 (0.164)	0.122 (0.180)	-0.117 (0.165)	0.021 (0.070)	-0.041 (0.069)	0.115 (0.419)	-0.234 (0.417)
Homeowner	-0.151 (0.175)	-0.164 (0.190)	0.004 (0.176)	0.037 (0.074)	0.039 (0.074)	0.282 (0.444)	0.244 (0.437)
Constant	-0.353 (0.296)	0.056 (0.322)	-0.466 (0.298)	0.305* (0.126)	0.085 (0.125)	-1.052 (0.756)	-2.125** (0.765)
Observations	166	165	166	167	167	167	167

Standard errors in parentheses

Models: 1-3 are OLS on standardized DVs, 4-5 linear estimates with dichotomous DVs, 6-7 logit on the same DVs.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

Full model for Republican results in Figure 1 plus logit versions of the binary DVs (linear approximations reported in main text/figure).

Table A3: Change in Key DVs: Republicans

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Realism	Politicized	Legit	Reform Info	Appts Info	Reform Info Logit	Appts Info Logit
Post Observations	-0.090 (0.162)	-0.097 (0.161)	0.032 (0.173)	-0.092 (0.068)	0.001 (0.065)	-0.676 (0.475)	0.024 (0.465)
Political Info	0.139 <sup>+</sup> (0.070)	0.012 (0.070)	0.078 (0.075)	-0.052 <sup>+</sup> (0.030)	0.039 (0.028)	-0.345 <sup>+</sup> (0.196)	0.283 (0.199)
College Degree	-0.435* (0.196)	-0.204 (0.195)	-0.195 (0.209)	0.034 (0.083)	0.074 (0.079)	0.223 (0.518)	0.439 (0.532)
Female	-0.140 (0.167)	-0.260 (0.166)	0.148 (0.178)	-0.047 (0.070)	0.010 (0.067)	-0.381 (0.462)	0.034 (0.493)
Age	0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 <sup>+</sup> (0.002)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.033 <sup>+</sup> (0.017)
White	-0.148 (0.189)	0.068 (0.189)	-0.285 (0.203)	0.012 (0.080)	-0.087 (0.076)	0.081 (0.509)	-0.573 (0.513)
Homeowner	-0.335 <sup>+</sup> (0.177)	0.354* (0.177)	-0.428* (0.189)	-0.078 (0.075)	0.128 <sup>+</sup> (0.071)	-0.534 (0.478)	1.001 <sup>+</sup> (0.568)
Constant	-0.211 (0.331)	0.282 (0.330)	-0.118 (0.354)	0.472** (0.140)	0.252 <sup>+</sup> (0.133)	0.420 (0.905)	-1.124 (0.979)
Observations	158	159	159	159	159	159	159

Standard errors in parentheses

Models: 1-3 are OLS on standardized DVs, 4-5 linear estimates with dichotomous DVs, 6-7 logit on the same DVs.

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

## Comparing Measures of Diffuse Support

Plots from models (see below for full table) that incorporate both key outcome measures (interest in reform and legitimacy). On the left legitimacy is an independent variable, and significantly negatively related to interest in court reform. The two are flipped on the right with interest as reform an IV with legitimacy as the DV.




Figure A2: Estimates of respondent interest (linear probability model) in more information about reform as a function of legitimacy and other variables on left, and legitimacy as a function of interest in reform and other variables on the right. Models also include controls for age, college education, white, female, homeowner, and partisanship (pooled models only)

Full models for the Legitimacy DV panel in Figure A2. Interest in ideas about court reform is main IV of interest.

Table A4: Legitimacy as Function of Interest in Reform

	(1) Pooled	(2) Democrats	(3) Republicans
Post Observations	-0.178 (0.118)	-0.303 <sup>+</sup> (0.164)	0.002 (0.173)
Reform Curiosity	-0.272* (0.136)	-0.291 (0.187)	-0.321 (0.205)
Political Info	0.113* (0.047)	0.137* (0.062)	0.061 (0.075)
College Degree	-0.010 (0.133)	0.150 (0.174)	-0.184 (0.208)
Female	0.025 (0.123)	-0.108 (0.172)	0.133 (0.177)
Age	0.008* (0.004)	0.008 <sup>+</sup> (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)
White	-0.168 (0.127)	-0.111 (0.164)	-0.281 (0.202)
Homeowner	-0.180 (0.128)	0.014 (0.175)	-0.453* (0.189)
Democrat =1	0.070 (0.120)		
Constant	-0.321 (0.242)	-0.376 (0.302)	0.033 (0.365)
Observations	325	166	159

Standard errors in parentheses

All Models are OLS with standardized legitimacy index as DV

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$



Full models for the Interest in Reform panel in Figure A2. Standardized Legitimacy is main IV of interest. Includes linear approximation as in the figure plus logit equivalents.

Table A5: Reform Interest as Function of Legitimacy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pooled	Democrats	Republicans	Pooled Logit	Democrats Logit	Republicans Logit
Post Observations	0.036 (0.049)	0.154* (0.069)	-0.090 (0.068)	0.205 (0.287)	0.913* (0.404)	-0.682 (0.480)
Legitimacy	-0.046* (0.023)	-0.052 (0.034)	-0.050 (0.032)	-0.287* (0.143)	-0.322 (0.207)	-0.366+ (0.220)
Political Info	0.013 (0.020)	0.044+ (0.026)	-0.048 (0.030)	0.080 (0.120)	0.311+ (0.170)	-0.340+ (0.201)
College Degree	0.055 (0.055)	0.107 (0.073)	0.024 (0.083)	0.330 (0.314)	0.662 (0.430)	0.167 (0.530)
Female	-0.068 (0.051)	-0.104 (0.072)	-0.040 (0.070)	-0.396 (0.306)	-0.539 (0.428)	-0.341 (0.469)
Age	-0.003+ (0.002)	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.017+ (0.010)	-0.024+ (0.014)	-0.010 (0.016)
White	0.018 (0.053)	0.017 (0.070)	-0.003 (0.080)	0.078 (0.317)	0.079 (0.424)	-0.005 (0.519)
Homeowner	-0.023 (0.053)	0.033 (0.074)	-0.099 (0.076)	-0.161 (0.321)	0.251 (0.450)	-0.762 (0.506)
Democrat =1	0.060 (0.049)			0.367 (0.299)		
Constant	0.305** (0.099)	0.284* (0.126)	0.466** (0.140)	-0.797 (0.599)	-1.210 (0.765)	0.391 (0.915)
Observations	325	166	159	325	166	159

Standard errors in parentheses

Interest in Reform Ideas is DV in all models. 1-3 are linear, 4-6 are logit equivalents.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

# Relationships Between Variables

Models for Figure 3. Includes linear and logit estimates for the binary DV.

Table A6: Relationships Between Realism and Politicization and DVs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pre Legit	Post Legit	Pre Reform	Post Reform	Pre Reform Logit	Post Reform Logit
Democrat	0.084 (0.128)	-0.339* (0.171)	-0.002 (0.061)	0.177+ (0.090)	-0.035 (0.380)	1.047+ (0.545)
Realism	0.353** (0.067)	0.454** (0.090)	0.016 (0.032)	-0.022 (0.047)	0.111 (0.197)	-0.126 (0.261)
Politicization	-0.608** (0.064)	-0.545** (0.088)	0.045 (0.030)	0.024 (0.047)	0.337 (0.205)	0.144 (0.269)
Political Info	0.063 (0.052)	0.060 (0.069)	-0.003 (0.024)	0.006 (0.036)	-0.028 (0.160)	0.014 (0.216)
College Degree	-0.004 (0.146)	-0.035 (0.179)	0.068 (0.069)	0.070 (0.095)	0.373 (0.434)	0.458 (0.515)
Female	-0.030 (0.130)	0.038 (0.201)	-0.074 (0.062)	-0.015 (0.106)	-0.448 (0.390)	-0.176 (0.592)
Age	0.006 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.003+ (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.025+ (0.013)	-0.022 (0.017)
White	-0.071 (0.133)	-0.222 (0.182)	0.086 (0.063)	-0.084 (0.096)	0.520 (0.409)	-0.509 (0.549)
Homeowner	-0.104 (0.136)	0.064 (0.183)	0.033 (0.064)	-0.094 (0.097)	0.250 (0.423)	-0.529 (0.539)
Constant	-0.249 (0.269)	0.073 (0.319)	0.322* (0.128)	0.420* (0.168)	-0.592 (0.827)	-0.200 (0.983)
Observations	213	110	213	110	213	110

Standard errors in parentheses

Models: 1-2 are OLS on standardized DVs, 3-4 linear estimates with dichotomous DVs, 5-6 logit on the same DVs.

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$